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COMMISSIONER v. ENGLE: DEPLETION ON
PREPRODUCTION RECEIPTS-SUPREME
COURT REVIVES FEDERAL SUBSIDY
FOR NONPRODUCING OIL
AND GAS LEASES
I. INTRODUCTION
The tax law allows producers of oil and gas an annual depletion 1
deduction against the income generated from oil and gas property.' Tax-
payers may deduct from their taxable incomes the larger of two depletion
allowances: cost or percentage.3 Under the cost method, taxpayers re-
cover their adjusted basis4 in an oil and gas interest over its productive
life.' Under the percentage method, taxpayers deduct a statutory per-
1. Depletion is the exhaustion of a natural resource usually by severance or production.
See United States v. Ludey, 274 U.S. 295, 302 (1927) (cost depletion permitted as a deduction
from gross income even though such depletion is necessarily a rough estimate); Lynch v. Al-
worth-Stephens Co., 267 U.S. 364, 368-70 (1925) (leasehold interest held sufficient property
interest to give rise to depletion allowance). Oil and gas reserves are generally depleted by
drilling wells followed by production. See generally 8 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND
GAS LAW 211-12 (1984).
2. I.R.C. §§ 611, 612, 613, 613A (1982).
Federal tax law provides taxpayers with a depletion allowance as a means of cost recovery
corresponding to the production of income from their mineral interests. In Anderson v.
Helvering, 310 U.S. 404, 407-08 (1940) (proceeds from oil and gas production paid to lease
vendor in connection with sale of lease includable in vendee's gross income), the Supreme
Court stated:
Oil and gas reserves like other minerals in place, are recognized as wasting as-
sets. The production of oil and gas, like the mining of ore, is treated as an income-
producing operation, not as a conversion of capital investment as upon a sale, and is
said to resemble a manufacturing business carried on by the use of the soil.... The
granting of an arbitrary deduction, in the interests of convenience, of a percentage of
the gross income derived from the severance of oil and gas, merely emphasizes the
underlying theory of the allowance as a tax-free return of the capital consumed by
the production of gross income through severance.
See also, e.g., Lee v. Commissioner, 126 F.2d 825, 825 (5th Cir. 1942); Badger Oil Co. v.
Commissioner, 118 F.2d 791, 793 (5th Cir. 1941); Burke v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 1167, 1174
(1945); Nelson Land & Oil Co., 3 B.T.A. 315, 325-26 (1926); Missouri-Lincoln Trust Co. v.
Commissioner, 2 T.C.M. (CCH) 427, 429 (1943).
3. I.R.C. § 613(a) (1982).
4. Id. § 612. Section 612 provides that "the basis on which depletion is to be allowed in
respect of any property shall be the adjusted basis... for the purpose of determining the gain
upon the sale or other disposition of such property." Id. For the statutory provisions defining
"adjusted basis," see id. §§ 1011-1016 (1982 & Supp. 1984).
5. Id. § 611(a). Treas. Reg. § 1.611-2(a)(1) (1960) provides the following rule for com-
puting cost depletion:
The basis upon which cost depletion is to be allowed in respect of any mineral prop-
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centage of the gross income generated by their oil and gas interest.
Two theories underlie the depletion deduction scheme. One theory
is that the taxpayer is gradually selling his interest in the property,
thereby recovering his invested capital7 as the oil and gas are extracted
and sold.' This theory applies to cost depletion because the deduction is
limited to the historic cost of the taxpayer's investment. The second the-
ory is that the deduction functions as a federal subsidy stimulating addi-
tional exploration and production of oil and gas. 9 This theory applies to
erty is the basis provided for in section 612 ... . After the amount of such basis
applicable to the mineral property has been determined for the taxable year, the cost
depletion for that year shall be computed by dividing such amount by the number of
units of mineral remaining as of the taxable year .... and by multiplying the deple-
tion unit, so determined, by the number of units of mineral sold within the taxable
year ....
Id. Thus, in summary, cost depletion is calculated by a unit of sale method in which the
adjusted basis of the mineral interest is divided by the estimated recoverable reserves. This
amount is then multiplied by the number of units sold during the taxable year.
6. I.R.C. § 613(a) (1982). Section 613(a) provides, in pertinent part:
In the case of... mines, wells, and other natural deposits..., the allowance for
depletion under section 611 shall be the percentage, specified in subsection (b), of the
gross income from the property excluding from such gross income an amount equal
to any rents or royalties paid or incurred by the taxpayer in respect of the property.
Such allowance shall not exceed 50 percent of the taxpayer's taxable income from the
property (computed without allowance for depletion).
Id. For oil and gas production occurring during the 1984 calendar year and beyond, the statu-
tory percentage rate is 15%. Id. § 613A(c)(5).
Prior to the Tax Reduction Act of 1975, infra note 15, all taxpayers owning an interest in
oil and gas property were entitled to deduct percentage depletion under I.R.C. § 613. Under
the 1975 Act, which added § 613A to the Internal Revenue Code, the percentage depletion
allowance was limited to a narrow range of taxpayers, most notably, independent producers
and royalty owners. The Act also limited the quantity of oil and gas production which is
available for percentage depletion and reduced the oil and gas percentage depletion rate. For
further discussion of § 613A, see infra notes 17-19.
7. Under I.R.C. § 612, a taxpayer recovers his invested capital by means of depleting a
portion of his "adjusted basis," supra note 4, in the property. I.R.C. § 612 (1982).
8. United States v. Ludey, 274 U.S. 295, 302 (1927); see also supra note 1. In Commis-
sioner v. I. A. O'Shaughnessy, Inc., 124 F.2d 33 (10th Cir. 1941) (vendor's contractual right to
proceed with sale of oil and gas interest contingent upon future oil and gas production held
depletable economic oil and gas interest in hands of vendor), the court found that Congress
granted to taxpayers the depletion deduction to avoid the taxation of capital. The court stated
that "[iut is clear that it was the Congressional purpose to allow return of capital through
statutory depletion from the date of the acquisition of the depletable interest, so long as gross
income is realized dependent upon the production of oil or gas." Id. at 37. Cf Anderson v.
Helvering, 310 U.S. 404, 407-08 (1940); see also supra note 2.
Although cost depletion is limited to the taxpayer's adjusted basis in his oil and gas inter-
est, percentage depletion usually exceeds the amount of capital invested, and therefore does not
support the return of capital theory. For further discussion, see infra notes 9-11 and accompa-
nying text.
9. See Landis, The Impact of the Income Tax Laws on the Energy Crisis: Oil and Con-
gress Don't Mix, 64 CALIF. L. REv. 1040, 1060-61 (1976); Baker, The Nature of Depletable
Income, 7 TAx. L. REv. 267, 270-71 (1952).
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percentage depletion because the taxpayer is allowed a deduction in ex-
cess of his investment cost recovery. In effect, the taxpayer receives in-
come free of tax to the extent that the percentage depletion amount
exceeds the amount otherwise allowable under cost depletion.'0 Thus,
percentage depletion subsidizes exploration and development of oil and
gas by providing producers with tax-free income, thereby increasing the
availability of capital for reinvestment. 1'
For many years, the percentage depletion deduction had come
under congressional attack because the major oil companies, availing
themselves of the deduction, were reaping significant amounts of tax-free
income.1 2 Numerous economic studies were published indicating that
the incentive to develop new oil was not significantly enhanced by per-
centage depletion.13 In 1969, Congress reduced the percentage depletion
rate from 27.5% to 22%. 11 Finally, in its Tax Reduction Act of 1975,15
Congress added section 613A to the Internal Revenue Code16 which re-
pealed the percentage depletion deduction on foreign oil and gas produc-
10. The percentage depletion deduction, however, reduces the taxpayer's adjusted basis in
his oil and gas interest. I.R.C. § 1016(a)(2) (1982); Treas. Reg. § 1.1016-3(a)(1) (1957). Thus,
the deduction may result in increasing the taxpayer's gain, or reducing his loss, upon disposi-
tion of his oil and gas interest. Further, the excess of the allowable depletion deduction over
the taxpayer's adjusted basis is a tax preference item under I.R.C. § 57(a)(8) (1982). Thus, the
deduction may trigger or increase a noncorporate taxpayer's alternative minimum tax under
I.R.C. § 55 or a corporate taxpayer's minimum tax under I.R.C. § 56.
As a tax preference item, the percentage depletion deduction may have a curious multi-
plying effect when combined with the tax preference on excess intangible drilling costs (ID).
Excess IDC is calculated on net income from an oil and gas interest after the depletion allow-
ance is deducted. I.R.C. § 57(a)(11)(C) (1982). Hence, percentage depletion as a tax prefer-
ence item will, in turn, increase a taxpayer's IDC. The overall effect is'that one additional
dollar of percentage depletion preference may result in two additional dollars of total prefer-
ences. It is appropriate that the tax benefit rule under I.R.C. § 58(h) be applied under these
circumstances since "the tax treatment giving rise to such items will not result in the reduction
of the taxpayer's tax. . . ." I.R.C. § 58(h) (1982); ARTHUR YOUNG'S OIL & GAS FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION 356 (J. Houghton 22d ed. 1984).
11. See Landis, supra note 9, at 1060; Baker, supra note 9, at 270-71. The subsidy theory
presumes that the taxpayer will reinvest the additional cash flow generated by his tax-free
income in further exploration and development of oil and gas. The Internal Revenue Code,
however, requires no such reinvestment as a requirement for deducting the percentage deple-
tion allowance. To the extent that percentage depletion is allowed on preproduction receipts,
percentage depletion may actually result in a deferral of oil and gas production by subsidizing
the holding costs of an oil and gas lease. For further discussion, see infra note 217 and accom-
panying text.
12. See Landis, supra note 9, at 1061.
13. Landis, supra note 9, at 1062.
14. Pub. L. No. 91-172 § 501, 83 Stat. 487, 629 (1969).
15. Pub. L. No. 94-12, 89 Stat. 26 (1975) (applying to taxable years ending after December
31, 1974).
16. All references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended.
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tion and severely restricted the deduction on domestic oil and gas
production. 17
Although section 613A preserved percentage depletion for in-
dependent producers and royalty owners, it required that the deduction
be computed "with respect to so much of the taxpayer's average daily
production" as does not exceed the taxpayer's depletable oil and gas
quantity.1 8 The statute limited the taxpayer's depletable oil quantity to
an average daily production amount of 2,000 barrels declining to 1,000
barrels over a five year period." The statute's provision of allowing per-
17. 1.RLC. § 613A (1982 & Supp. 1984). Section 613A(a) provides for a general repeal of
percentage depletion on oil and gas receipts. Id. § 613A(a) (1982). This subsection states:
"Except as otherwise provided in this section, the allowance for depletion under section 611
with respect to any oil or gas well shall be computed without regard to section 613." Id.
Section 613A(b)-(c) provides for specific exemptions from the repeal with respect to do-
mestic oil and gas production. Id. § 613A(b)-(c) (1982 & Supp. 1984). Subsection 613A(b)
exempts production from domestic wells with respect to regulated natural gas, natural gas sold
under fixed contract and natural gas from geopressured brine. Id. § 613A(b) (1982). Subsec-
tion 613A(c) exempts independent producers and royalty owners. Id. § 613A(c) (1982 &
Supp. 1984).
Section 613A(c) grants to all producers of oil and gas the status of independent producer
or royalty owner other than those producers specifically excluded from this status under
§ 613A(d). Id. § 613A(c)-(d). Those excluded under § 613A(d) include oil and gas retailers
and refiners. Id. § 613A(d)(2), 613A(d)(4). Section 613A(d)(2) defines retailers as those
who directly, or through a related person, [sell] oil or natural gas .... or any product
derived from oil or natural gas...
(A) through any retail outlet operated by the taxpayer or a related person, or
(B) to any person-
(i) obligated under an agreement... with the taxpayer... to use a trade-
mark ... owned by such taxpayer... or
(ii) given authority, pursuant to an agreement.., with the taxpayer .., to
occupy any retail outlet owned... by the taxpayer ....
Id. § 613A(d)(2). However, retailers with gross receipts not exceeding $5,000,000 from their
retail operations during the taxable year are specifically not excluded from the § 613A(c) ex-
emption. Id.
Section 613A(d)(4) defines refiners as those who engage "in the refining of crude oil ... if
on any day during the taxable year the refinery runs of the taxpayer... exceed 50,000 barrels."
Id. § 613A(d)(4) (1982).
Hereinafter, retailers and refiners satisfying the requirements of § 613A(d) will be collec-
tively referred to as the major integrated oil companies.
18. Id. § 613A(c)(1). The full text of § 613A(c)(1) provides the following:
Except as provided in subsection (d), the allowance for depletion under section
611 shall be computed in accordance with section 613 with respect to-
(A) so much of the taxpayer's average daily production of domestic crude
oil as does not exceed the taxpayer's depletable oil quantity; and
(B) so much of the taxpayer's average daily production of domestic natu-
ral gas as does not exceed the taxpayer's depletable natural gas quantity;
and the applicable percentage (determined in accordance with the table contained in
paragraph (5)) shall be deemed to be specified in subsection (b) of section 613 for
purposes of subsection (a) of that section.
Id.
19. Id. § 613A(c)(3) (1982 & Supp. 1984). The depletable quantity limitation of 2,000
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centage depletion "with respect to... average daily production" immedi-
ately raised the following issue: Does the Act allow a percentage
depletion deduction during a taxable year where the taxpayer has re-
ceived advance royalty20 and lease bonus21 income even though there has
been no actual oil and gas production?
barrels applies to the aggregate production of both oil and gas. Id. § 613A(c)(4) (1982).
Under § 613A(d), gas volume is equated to barrels in a ratio of 6,000 cubic feet of gas to one
barrel. Id. The statute further limited the percentage depletion allowance by gradually reduc-
ing the percentage depletion rate on primary oil and gas production from 22% to 15% over a
10 year period. Id. § 613A(c)(5). The percentage depletion allowance on secondary/tertiary
production remained at a 22% rate through the end of 1983. Id. § 613A(c)(6)(C). Beginning
in 1984, the percentage depletion rate on secondary/tertiary production dropped to 15%,
which is equal to the 1984 percentage depletion rate on primary production. Id.
§ 613A(c)(3)(A)(ii) (1982 & Supp. 1984). For an illustration of the tax impact of the declining
depletable quantity limitation and percentage depletion rates, see Table I infra note 213.
20. An advance royalty is a prepayment collected by a mineral lessor from the lessee prior
to mineral production. The lessee offsets this prepayment against future royalty payments
owing to the lessor. 8 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW, 24-25 (1984). For
further discussion and comparison with lease bonus payments, see infra note 21.
21. A lease bonus payment is typically cash in consideration for the execution of a mineral
lease paid by the lessee to the lessor. 8 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW, 80
(1984).
In federal income taxation, the terms "advance royalty" and "lease bonus" are not pre-
cisely defined and, at times, have been used interchangeably. Note, Taxation-Percentage De-
pletion Not Available With Regard to Advance Royalties Received on Non-Producing Oil and
Gas Lease, 56 TULANE L. REv. 1082, 1087 n.33 (1982). One author recently provided an
excellent comparative analysis of lease bonus and advance royalty receipts as follows:
Lease bonuses are amounts received by a lessor.., in consideration for entering
into a mineral lease, which is a transaction whereby minerals in place and the right to
exploit the minerals are conveyed to a lessee .... The lessor reserves a right to share
in mineral production for the life of the property free of cost, expense and liability.
The interest conveyed to the lessee in a mineral leasing transaction is referred to as
the working interest (which is burdened with the costs of exploration, development
and production), and the interest reserved by the lessor is a royalty.
An advance royalty is... an amount that is paid in advance to a mineral lessor
against future entitlements to royalty payments. As the minerals actually are pro-
duced and the prescribed royalties become payable, the amounts paid as advance
royalties are offset against the lessee's obligation to pay the prescribed royalty. The
offset may be based on dollar amounts or units of production. For example, a lessor
might retain a one-eighth royalty in an oil and gas leasing transaction payable in
advance each year to the extent of $10,000, recoupable out of production attributable
to the royalty in the succeeding year or years. If the offset is measured in dollars,
then the first $10,000 of royalty production in each year (and perhaps more if the
recoupment is cumulative) would be retained by the lessee to recoup his advance
payment. In the alternative, the advance royalty could be stated in terms of a
number of barrels, or the $10,000 amount could be converted to barrels at a stipu-
lated price, and the recoupment each year could relate to a number of barrels of oil
rather than a dollar amount. It is this recoupment by the lessee of prepaid amounts
that distinguishes an advance royalty from a [lease] bonus, as to which there is no
specific recoupment.
DeBerry, Supreme Court in Engle allows percentage depletion on bonuses and advance royalties,
60 J. TAX'N 274, 274 (1984).
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Addressing this issue, the Internal Revenue Service22 took the posi-
tion that advance royalty and lease bonus receipts are eligible for per-
centage depletion only to the extent that these receipts are attributable to
contemporaneous oil and gas production.23 Thus, according to the IRS,
section 613A's depletable quantity clause rendered actual oil and gas pro-
duction during the taxable year a prerequisite to any percentage deple-
tion deduction.
In Commissioner v. Engle24 the Supreme Court held in a five to four
decision that advance royalty and lease bonus receipts are eligible for the
percentage depletion allowance under section 613A(c) despite the ab-
sence of actual oil and gas production during the taxable year.2" Point-
ing out that percentage depletion was allowable on advance royalties and
lease bonuses prior to the enactment of section 613A, the majority stated
that "it [is] clear... that Congress did not mean.., to withdraw the
percentage depletion allowance on lease bonus or advance royalty in-
come arising from oil and gas properties."
2 6
In reaching its decision, the Court emphasized that "[s]ection
613A's goal... was to subsidize the combined efforts of small producers
and royalty owners in the exploration and production of the Nation's oil
and gas resources,"'2 7 thereby increasing domestic production.28 The
percentage depletion allowance on advance royalty and lease bonus re-
ceipts would also enhance domestic production by means of risk spread-
22. Hereinafter referred to as "the IRS."
23. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.613A-7(f), 42 Fed. Reg. 24,287 (1977), see infra note 160; Rev.
Rul. 81-44, 1981-1 C.B. 384, see infra note 161. This is in stark contrast to prior Supreme
Court decisions which held that advance royalty and lease bonus receipts were eligible for the
percentage depletion allowance. See infra notes 144-50 and accompanying text.
24. 464 U.S. 206 (1984), affig 677 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1982), rev'g 76 T.C. 915 (1981), rev'g
and remanding Farmar v. United States, 689 F.2d 1017 (Ct. Cl. 1982).
25. Engle, 464 U.S. at 224. The Court stated, however, that it would not render a decision
on the timing of the deduction because the issue was not raised by any of the parties. Id. at
227. The Court deferred to the Commissioner to determine the timing of the deduction, sug-
gesting that the deduction could be deferred until a taxable year within which actual produc-
tion occurs. Id. at 226-27. Alternatively, the Court observed that the deduction could be
taken within the current year and then adjusted in future years by means of amended income
tax returns. Id. at 226.
26. Id. at 223-24. Because the Court split five to four in its decision, in the opinion of at
least four Supreme Court Justices it is not "clear" that "Congress did not mean,., to with-
draw the percentage depletion allowance on lease bonus or advance royalty income." Id.
27. Id. at 218. The majority also acknowledged that Congress' repeal of percentage deple-
tion under § 613A was in response to "the alleged excessive profits that major integrated oil
companies were earning." Id. at 217. However, the majority emphasized that the "goal" of
§ 613A was to subsidize small producers and royalty owners. Id. at 218.
28. Id. at 217-18 & n.15.
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ing between small and large producers.29 In turn, increased domestic
production would help to counteract the United States' growing depen-
dence on foreign energy sources.30
This Note will challenge the Court's view that section 613A's essen-
tial purpose was to provide a subsidy for small producers and royalty
owners, thereby increasing domestic production. Further, any risk
spreading between small and large producers resulting from the percent-
age depletion allowance on advance royalties and lease bonuses would
defeat a prevailing goal of the statute, namely, denying percentage deple-
tion to large integrated oil companies. Finally, contrary to the intent of
the Court, the decision may provide significant financial incentive for de-
ferring domestic oil and gas production.
II. CoMMIssIoNER v. ENGLE
A. Statement of the Case
The Engle decision consolidates two cases: Commissioner v. Engle
and Farmar v. United States.31
During 1975, Fred Engle and his wife assigned their oil and gas
lease to third parties, while retaining overriding royalties. As partial
consideration of these assignments, the Engles received $7,600 in ad-
vance royalties. These royalties constituted the entire income that the
Engles received from the property in 1975 because there was no oil and
gas production that year. On their joint federal income tax return for
1975, the Engles claimed a percentage depletion deduction equal to 22%
of the advance royalties.32 The Commissioner of the Internal Revenue33
disallowed the deduction because the advance royalties were not received
"with respect to" any "average daily production" of oil and gas.34 The
Tax Court upheld the determination of the Commissioner.35 The Sev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in favor of the Engles.36 The
United States Supreme Court affirmed.
Also during 1975, the families of Philip D. Farmar and A. A. Sugg
leased as joint owners their oil and gas interests to various lessees. Under
29. Id. at 218-19 & n.17. For a discussion of risk spreading, see infra note 61 and accom-
panying text.
30. Engle, 464 U.S. at 217.
31. 464 U.S. 206 (1984).
32. Id. at 212.
33. Hereinafter referred to as "the Commissioner."
34. Engle, 464 U.S. at 212.
35. Engle v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 915, 927 (1981).
36. Engle v. Commissioner, 677 F.2d 594, 602 (7th Cir. 1982).
37. Engle, 464 U.S. at 227-28.
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the leases, Farmar and Sugg were to receive both royalties from oil and
gas produced and annual cash bonuses even if no oil and gas were pro-
duced. In 1976, oil and gas were discovered and produced in substantial
amounts on the property covered by the lessees. Farmar and Sugg
claimed percentage depletion deductions on both the bonuses and royal-
ties received in that year.38 The Commissioner disallowed the percentage
depletion deduction on the lease bonuses, because income of this type
was not received "with respect to" any "average daily production.1
3 9
After paying the assessed tax deficiencies, Farmar and Sugg filed suit for
refund in the United States Court of Claims, which held for the Commis-
sioner.' The United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded.41
B. The Reasoning of the Majority
In reaching the conclusion that advance royalty and lease bonus re-
ceipts are available for percentage depletion, Justice O'Connor, writing
for the majority,42 first examined the language of section 613A. The ma-
jority observed that the statute's language authorizes independent produ-
cers and royalty owners to take an allowance for percentage depletion in
accordance with section 613's "gross income from property"43 concept.'
Section 613A further provides that the allowance must be "with respect
to... so much of the taxpayer's average daily production... as does not
exceed the taxpayer's depletable.., quantity. '45 Finally, the statute re-
peatedly refers to "production" during the "taxable year.",4 6 Noting that
these references could not have been completely inadvertent, the majority
explored three possible interpretations of the statute.
1. Three possible interpretations of section 613A
The first interpretation of section 613A reflects the position of the
Commissioner. The statute's repeated references to the taxpayer's "aver-
38. Id. at 213.
39. Id.
40. Farmar v. United States, 689 F.2d 1017, 1025 (Ct. Cl. 1982).
41. Engle, 464 U.S. at 228.
42. Id. at 208. Justice O'Connor was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell,
Rehnquist and Stevens. Id.
43. Supra note 6 (citing pertinent part of I.R.C. § 613(a) (1982)).
44. Commissioner v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206, 214-15 (1984). Section 613A(c)(1) provides that
"the allowance for depletion under section 611 shall be computed in accordance with section
613." I.R.C. § 613A(c)(1) (1982). Section 613(a), supra note 6, provides the general rule for
percentage depletion with respect to all eligible natural resources.
45. I.R.C. § 613A(c)(1) (1982). The depletable quantity limitation is provided under
I.R.C. § 613A(c)(3) (1982 & Supp. 1984). See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
46. Engle, 464 U.S. at 215; see infra notes 47-48.
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age daily production,"'47 "aggregate production," "production during the
taxable year" and "production during the calendar year"48 redefines and
limits depletable "gross income from property" to income attributable to
oil and gas production during the taxable year.49 Therefore, because ad-
vance royalty and lease bonus receipts are not attributable to "specific"
production during any taxable year, Congress could not have intended
that such receipts would be eligible for percentage depletion under sec-
tion 613A.5 0
The second and third interpretations of section 613A favor the view
of the taxpayers. These interpretations share the common ground that
the statute's reference to "average daily production" constitutes "a limi-
tation on the amount of, rather than a prerequisite to, the deduction a
taxpayer may claim."51 The statute's requirement that the depletion de-
duction be calculated "with respect to ... average daily production" is
"simply the pre-1975 recapture requirement reenacted: depletion deduc-
tions must always 'be with respect to' actual or prospective extraction."52
Because advance royalty and lease bonus receipts constitute "income
arising from the property, '5 3 these receipts are eligible for percentage
depletion as long as they do not exceed section 61 3A's depletable quan-
tity limitation and production eventually occurs on the property. 4
Although the second and third interpretations of the statute support
the eligibility of preproduction receipts for percentage depletion, they dif-
fer from one another with respect to the timing of the deduction. Under
the second interpretation, the percentage depletion deduction attributa-
ble to preproduction receipts would be available during the taxable year
in which such payments are received.55 Under the third interpretation,
the percentage depletion deduction attributable to preproduction receipts
would be deferred to a year in which it could be attributed to actual
production. The deferred deduction "would be capitalized and amor-
tized against income in years of actual extraction, subject to the rates and
47. I.R.C. § 613A(c)(1) (1982).
48. Id. § 613A(c)(2)-(10) (1982 & Supp. 1984).
49. Engle, 464 U.S. at 215.
50. Id. at 215-16 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
51. Id. at 216.
52. Id.
53. Id. Section 613, providing the general rule for percentage depletion, does not incorpo-
rate the phrase "income arising from the property" but rather the phrase "gross income from
the property." I.R.C. § 613(a) (1982). Presumably, the majority is referring to this latter
phrase as found in the statute.
54. Engle, 464 U.S. at 216.
55. Id.
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depletable quantities limitations applicable in those subsequent years." 6
The majority noted that all of these interpretations may be recon-
ciled with the language of the statute as a whole and provide meaning to
the statute's repeated references to "production" during the "taxable
year."57 In light of these alternative interpretations, the majority stated
that the Court's "duty then is 'to find that interpretation which can most
fairly be said to be imbedded in the statute, in the sense of being most
harmonious with its scheme and with the general purposes that Congress
manifested.' "58 Thus, the majority considered whether the statute is
more harmonious with the Commissioner's interpretation which com-
pletely denies percentage depletion on advance royalty and lease bonus
receipts, or with the second and third interpretations which allow per-
centage depletion on such receipts but differ as to the timing of the de-
duction. To this end, the majority analyzed the statute in terms of its
purpose and historic context, the legislative process leading to its enact-
ment, the statutory language itself and the practical problems of
administration.
2. Purpose and historic context
First the majority examined section 613A's purpose and historic
context. The majority observed that section 613A was enacted in re-
sponse to the nation's growing dependence on foreign oil and to the al-
leged excessive profits accruing to the major integrated oil companies.
Congress sought to encourage both domestic oil and gas production and
to improve the competitive position of the small oil and gas producers
vis-a-vis the major integrated oil companies.5 9 Thus, the majority con-
cluded that any reasonable interpretation of section 613A must harmo-
nize with the statute's goal of "subsidiz[ing] the combined efforts of small
producers and royalty owners in the exploration and production of the
Nation's oil and gas resources," thereby increasing domestic
production.'
The majority contended that the Commissioner's interpretation
frustrates the statute's goal of increasing domestic oil and gas production
by small producers. By eliminating percentage depletion on advance roy-
alty and lease bonus receipts, "lessors and lessees interested in favorable
56. Id. at 217 (footnote omitted).
57. Id.
58. Id. (quoting NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282, 297 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part)). See infra note 168.
59. Engle, 464 U.S. at 217-18.
60. Id. at 218.
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tax benefits [would] not use financing arrangements that provide for pre-
payments on production, that spread income to nonproduction periods
or, more importantly, that shift the risks of nonproduction to the parties
better able to bear them."61 Accordingly, lessors would begin demand-
ing increased production royalties to offset increased expenses related to
delayed receipts, income bunching and risk bearing. Lessees, burdened
with increased preproduction lease payments, would have less available
capital for exploration and development. In the long run, domestic oil
and gas production would decrease. Therefore, the Commissioner's in-
terpretation fails to comport with the statute's goal of increasing domes-
tic oil and gas production by small producers.62
In contrast, the majority pointed out that the second and third inter-
pretations, which allow percentage depletion on preproduction receipts,
"makes available the maximum public subsidy that Congress was willing
to provide."6 Maximizing the depletion subsidy, in turn, maximizes the
incentive for increased oil and gas exploration and development. In the
long run, domestic oil and gas production would increase. Therefore, the
Court found that only the second and third interpretations harmonize
with the statute's goal."4
3. Legislative process
The majority next examined the legislative process by which section
613A was enacted. When the legislation resulting in the addition of sec-
tion 613A to the Internal Revenue Code first was introduced, neither the
bill, H.R. 2166,6" nor the accompanying House Ways and Means Com-
mittee report66 provided for the repeal of the percentage depletion deduc-
tion for oil and gas production.67 It was only when H.R. 2166 reached
61. Id. (footnote omitted). In a footnote, the majority expanded this argument as follows:
Lease bonuses generally are not refundable to lessees even if no oil or gas is pro-
duced from the property.... Smaller risk averse lessors, therefore, are likely to
prefer these sums certain to uncertain sums, like advance royalties or royalty
streams, that either may not materialize or may have to be returned.... Conversely,
lessees prefer to condition their advance payments on eventual production.... But
since lessees can spread their risks over many leased properties, they predictably will
be willing to pay nonrefundable lease bonuses in exchange for reduced prices on the
overall lease arrangements. By pooling risks in this fashion, lessors and lessees, like
insurers and insureds, optimize the allocation of resources in the production of oil
and gas from the property.
Id. at 218 n.17 (citations omitted).
62. Id. at 219.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. H.R. 2166, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
66. H.R. REP. No. 19, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
67. Engle, 464 U.S. at 220.
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the House floor that the bill was amended to repeal percentage depletion
for all classes of producers of oil and gas.68 When H.R. 2166 subse-
quently reached the Senate floor, the bill was further amended to exempt
independent producers and royalty owners from the repeal of the per-
centage depletion deduction.69 With "slight alteration" by the Confer-
ence Committee, Congress then enacted H.R. 2166 as amended by the
Senate.70
68. 121 CONG. REc. 4651-52 (1975). The majority stated that the House floor amendment
"did not contain any of the exemptions ultimately enacted as part of § 613A." Engle, 464 U.S.
at 220. This is not the case. The House amendment provided an exemption from the percent-
age depletion repeal for natural gas sold under a fixed contract which eventually became codi-
fied at I.R.C. § 613A(b)(1)(B), 613A(b)(3)(A). H.R. CONF. REP. No. 120, 94th Cong., Ist
Sess., 67-68 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 54, 132-34.
The Conference Committee report elegantly summarizes the legislative history of H.R.
2166, stating in pertinent part:
PERCENTAGE DEPLETION FOR OIL AND GAs
House bilL-The House bill repeals percentage depletion generally for oil or gas
produced on or after January 1, 1975. Depletion is continued for natural gas sold
under a fixed price contract in effect February 1, 1975, which does not permit price
adjustment after that date to reflect repeal of depletion.
Senate amendment.-Under the Senate amendment, the deduction for percent-
age depletion is generally eliminated with respect to oil and gas produced on or after
January 1, 1975, with certain exceptions. These include the exceptions provided
under the House bill. In addition, the Senate amendment retains percentage deple-
tion at 22 percent on a permanent basis for the small independent producer to the
extent that his average daily production of oil does not exceed 2,000 barrels a day, or
his average daily production of natural gas does not exceed 12,000,000 cubic feet.
Where the independent producer has both oil and natural gas production, the exemp-
tion must be allocated between the two types of production.
Conference substitute.-The conference substitute follows the Senate amend-
ment in providing a small producer exemption from the repeal of percentage deple-
tion for oil and gas. Initially the exemption ("depletable oil quantity") is 2,000
barrels of average daily production (or 12,000,000 cubic feet of natural gas). How-
ever, the exemption is to be phased down gradually, but not eliminated, so as to
minimize the impact of the reduction on small independent producers.
Under the substitute, the exemption is to be reduced 200 barrels a year for 5
years from 1976 through 1980, when the permanent exemption of 1,000 barrels per
day will be reached. The depletion rate for oil and gas covered under the small
producer exemption will also be phased down gradually from 22 percent. In 1981,
the rate will be 20 percent; in 1982, 18 percent; in 1983, 16 percent; and in 1984 the
rate will be reduced to a permanent level of 15 percent....
The deduction resulting from the small producer exemption may not exceed 65
percent of the taxpayer's net income from all sources (computed without regard to
depletion allowed under the small producer exemption, net operating loss carrybacks
and capital loss carrybacks).
Id. at 67-68 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 54, 132-34.
69. Engle, 464 U.S. at 220. The Senate, however, imposed a limit of 2,000 barrels of aver-
age daily oil and gas production that would be eligible for percentage depletion. The Senate
left intact the statutory percentage depletion rate of 22%. See supra note 68.
70. Engle, 464 U.S. at 220. The Conference Committee modified the proposed legislation
as follows: (1) the 2,000 barrel per day depletable quantity limitation was reduced by 200
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The majority pointed out that neither the Senate nor the Conference
Committee, when considering H.R. 2166, suggested that percentage de-
pletion on advance royalties and lease bonuses should be repealed.71
Rather, both the Senate and the conferees agreed to maintain percentage
depletion "in its entirety" for independent producers and royalty owners,
subject to the annual depletable quantity limitation.7 2 Noting that the
Conference Committee in its report stated that the proposed legislation
"'retains percentage depletion . . . for the small independent pro-
ducer,' "" the Senate and Conference Committee "expressed a clear in-
tent to retain the percentage depletion rules as they then existed."'74
Further, for the past fifty years, under the rule adopted in Herring v.
Commissioner,7" advance royalty and lease bonus receipts have been eli-
gible for percentage depletion.76 The majority professed the principle
that "'Congress is ...aware of [our long-standing] interpretation of
[the] statute and... adopt[s] that interpretation when it re-enacts [the]
statute without [explicit] change. . . .' "'I Thus, had Congress intended
to eliminate percentage depletion on preproduction receipts it would
have addressed more explicitly the Court's prior decisions to the
contrary.78
Therefore, the majority reasoned that the legislative process by
which section 613A was enacted undermines the Commissioner's inter-
pretation which would deny percentage depletion on preproduction re-
ceipts. Rather, the legislative process harmonizes only with the second
and third interpretations of the statute, which allow percentage depletion
on preproduction receipts.79
barrels a year over a five year period to 1,000 barrels of average daily production and (2) the
22% depletion rate was gradually reduced to 15%. These modifications became part of the
final version of the legislation, supra note 68, codified at I.R.C. § 613A(c)(1)-(3), 613A(c)(5).
Although the majority describes these modifications as "slight," Table I infra note 213 sug-
gests otherwise, indicating that the Conference Committee's modifications reduce the maxi-
mum percentage depletion allowance by 65.9% over a 10 year period.
71. Engle, 464 U.S. at 220.
72. Id. at 221.
73. Id. (quoting H. CONFERENCE REPORT No. 120, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 67 (1975) re-
printed in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 54, 132) (emphasis added by the majority)).
See supra note 68.
74. Engle, 464 U.S. at 221 (emphasis in original). See supra note 68.
75. 293 U.S. 322, 324 (1934).
76. For further discussion of Herring, see infra text accompanying notes 149-50.
77. 464 U.S. at 225 (quoting Lorillard, a Division of Loew's Theatres v. Pons, 434 U.S.
575, 580 (1978) (bracketed portions provided by the Engle Court)).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 224.
Nov. 1985]
192 LOYOLA OF LOSANGELESLAW .REVIEW [Vol. 19:179
4. Statutory language
The majority next examined the text of section 613A itself. With
respect to methodology, the majority adopted the principle that
[t]he true meaning of a single section of a statute in a setting as
complex as that of the revenue acts, however precise its lan-
guage, cannot be ascertained if it be considered apart from re-
lated sections, or if the mind be isolated from the history of the
income tax legislation of which it is an integral part.80
The majority observed that Congress defined the class of taxpayers ex-
empted from the repeal of percentage depletion in terms of certain pro-
duction levels."1 Although section 613A clearly denies percentage
depletion attributable to production in excess of the depletable quantity
limitation, "nothing in the statute bars percentage depletion on income
received prior to actual production." 2 The majority concluded that as
long as oil and gas receipts can be allocated to production below the
annual depletable quantity limitation, "lease bonus and advance royalty
income come within the four corners of the percentage depletion provi-
sions" of section 613A.13 Therefore, the Commissioner's interpretation
of the statute, which denies percentage depletion on preproduction re-
ceipts, conflicts with the text of the statute itself. The Court found that,
again, only the second and third interpretations of the statute, which al-
low percentage depletion on preproduction receipts, harmonize with the
text of the statute.8 4
5. Practical problems of administration
Finally, the majority considered the practical problems related to
the administration of the statute. The majority acknowledged that sec-
tion 613A's various limitations render accurate calculation of the per-
centage depletion allowance "difficult" in the absence of actual
production during the taxable year.8 5 The majority asserted, however,
that the Commissioner can resolve these problems by requiring taxpayers
to defer percentage depletion deductions to years of actual production or
by requiring taxpayers to adjust percentage depletion deductions taken
during nonproduction years by filing amended returns in later tax
80. Id. at 223 (quoting Helvering v. Morgan's, Inc., 293 U.S. 121, 126 (1934)).
81. Id. at 224. For further discussion, see infra note 191.
82. Engle, 464 U.S. at 224.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 226.
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years.86 The majority further acknowledged that the Commissioner's in-
terpretation "might" render the statute "simpler to administer" by en-
tirely eliminating percentage depletion on preproduction receipts.87
Simpler administration, however, does not justify adopting a fundamen-
tally "unreasonable" interpretation of statutory language given its his-
tory and purpose.
88
The majority concluded that the Commissioner's interpretation of
the statute failed to harmonize with its purpose and historic context, with
the legislative process leading to its enactment, and with the text of the
statute itself.89 Acknowledging that the "'choice among reasonable in-
terpretations [of the statute] is for the Commissioner, not the courts,'"
the majority nonetheless found the Commissioner's interpretation unrea-
sonable and therefore would not defer to it.9" Further, the purpose, legis-
lative history and text of section 613A disclose a clear congressional
intent to retain percentage depletion on preproduction receipts.
Whatever the practical problems may be in calculating the deduction,
these problems may be overcome by appropriate regulations prescribed
by the Commissioner.91 Therefore, the majority held that advance roy-
alty and lease bonus receipts are eligible for percentage depletion under
section 613A despite the absence of any actual oil and gas production
during the taxable year.92 Further, the majority declined to render a de-
cision on the timing of the deduction because none of the parties directly
raised the issue for the Court's review.93 Rather, the majority deferred
the timing decision to the Commissioner, suggesting that the deduction
may be taken currently or deferred until the years of actual production.
94
86. Id. The majority pointed out that under I.RLC. § 7805(a) (1982), Congress granted the
Commissioner "broad authority to prescribe all 'needful rules and regulations' for the enforce-
ment of the [federal] tax laws." Engle, 464 U.S. at 227 (citation omitted). Apparently, for the
majority, the authority vested in the Commissioner is not so broad as to allow the Commis-
sioner to prescribe the rule of disallowing percentage depletion on preproduction oil and gas
receipts.
87. Engle, 464 U.S. at 227 (citation omitted).
88. Id. The majority stated that although the Commissioner's interpretation "might make
the statute 'simpler to administer,'. . . it does so by ignoring the language of the statute...."
Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Curiously, the majority earlier acknowledged that the
Commissioner's interpretation could be "reconciled with the language of the statute." Id. at
217 (emphasis added).
89. Id. at 224.
90. Id. (quoting National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 488
(1979)).
91. Id. at 226.
92. Id. at 227-28.
93. Id. at 227.
94. Id. at 226-27. The majority found support for its suggestion that the percentage deple-
tion deduction may be deferred until the years of actual production in Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1,
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C The Reasoning of the Dissent
Justice Blackmun, writing for the dissent,9" sided with the Commis-
sioner in asserting that section 613A renders advance royalty and lease
bonus receipts ineligible for percentage depletion.96 The dissent adopted
the standard of review that the Commissioner's administrative interpre-
tation is entitled to prevail as long as it is not" 'unreasonable and plainly
inconsistent with the revenue statutes.' "I' The dissent found that the
Commissioner's interpretation was consistent with section 613A's lan-
guage, legislative history and purpose, and that his interpretation was at
least as reasonable as the rival interpretations adopted by the majority.98
The dissent criticized the majority's conclusion of law as well as its
methodological approach to interpreting the Internal Revenue Code. In
Part I of its analysis, the dissent examined the statute's language, related
administrative problems, legislative history and congressional purpose.99
The dissent made its own case in support of the Commissioner's position
as well as exposing the weaknesses inherent in the majority's argument.
In Part II of its analysis, the dissent criticized the majority's methodolog-
ical approach to interpreting federal tax law.100
T.D. 6520, 1961-1 C.B. 52, 62. Engle, 464 U.S. at 227. This regulation provides, inter alla,
that "[i]f an expenditure results in the creation of an asset having a useful life which extends
substantially beyond the close of the taxable year, such an expenditure may not be deductible
... for the taxable year in which [it is] made." Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(1), T.D. 6520, 1961-1
C.B. 52, 62. Although the analogy may be apt, the majority's suggestion nonetheless repre-
sents an overturning of the well settled prior law that percentage depletion in the absence of
production is currently deductible. Herring v. Commissioner, 293 U.S. 322, 328 (1934). Curi-
ously, the Court failed to note any explicit indication in the language, legislative history or
congressional purpose of the 1975 Act which would support this change. In contrast, when
refuting the Commissioner's position, the Court observed that, precisely because there was no
indication in the language, legislative history or congressional purpose of the 1975 law repeal-
ing the allowance for percentage depletion on advance royalties and lease bonuses, the Com-
missioner's interpretation of the 1975 law overturning prior law was unreasonable. Engle, 464
U.S. at 224.
95. Engle v. Commissioner, 464 U.S. 206, 228 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice
Blackmun was joined by Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall. Id. (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
96. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
97. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741, 750 (1969);
Commissioner v. South Tex. Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948)). For further discussion,
see infra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
98. Engle, 464 U.S. at 228 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 228-36 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 236-37 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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1. Statutory language, administrative problems, legislative history and
congressional purpose
In Part I of its analysis, the dissent first examined the language of
the statute itself. The dissent observed that section 613A provides that
the percentage depletion allowance must be calculated with respect to
"average daily production"1 1 which the statute defines in terms of "ag-
gregate production of domestic crude oil or natural gas [produced]...
during the taxable year."' 2 The dissent pointed out that "taxable year"
is defined under section 7701(a)(23) in terms of the calendar or fiscal year
"upon the basis of which the taxable income is computed" with respect
to income taxes.10 3 Where percentage depletion on preproduction re-
ceipts is claimed in a calendar or fiscal year in which there is no actual
production, as the majority has allowed, the term "taxable year" must
"be given a meaning in § 613A(c) different from the one assigned to it by
§ 7701(23) [sic], because the 'taxable year' defined by § 7701(23) [sic] is
one during which no 'aggregate production,' and hence no 'average daily
production,' has occurred."'" Although the majority's interpretation is
problematic with respect to the combined reading of sections 613A(c)
and 7701(a)(23), the Commissioner's interpretation encounters no such
problems. Because the Commissioner would allow no percentage deple-
tion on income received during a taxable year in which there is no pro-
duction, the meaning of "taxable year" in section 613A remains
consistent with section 7701(a)(23)'s definition of "taxable year." There-
fore, the majority's interpretation "does not fit the language of § 613A so
closely that the Commissioner's interpretation becomes unreasonable on
textual grounds."'' 0
The dissent next considered the practical administrative problems
posed by the majority's interpretation of the statute. Section 613A's de-
pletion limitations are based on factors of actual production quantities,
the type of mineral produced, and the nature of the extraction process.
0 6
Because these factors cannot be determined prior to actual production, a
taxpayer who claims percentage depletion on preproduction receipts
"cannot possibly establish ex ante how many barrels of oil or cubic feet
of gas his advance payment represents."' 1 7 In contrast, the Commis-
101. I.R.C. § 613A(c)(2) (1982).
102. Id. § 613A(c)(2)(A); Engle, 464 U.S. at 229 (Blackmun, 3., dissenting) (emphasis pro-
vided by the dissent).
103. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(23) (1982); Engle, 464 U.S. at 229 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
104. Engle, 464 U.S. at 229 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
105. Id. (Blackmun, ., dissenting).
106. I.R.C. § 613A(b)-(c) (1982). See supra notes 17-19.
107. Engle, 464 U.S. at 229 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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sioner's interpretation which would eliminate percentage depletion on
preproduction receipts poses no such practical administrative
problems. 108
The majority has asserted that the Commissioner can overcome the
problem of calculating section 613A's production limitation with respect
to preproduction receipts "in a number of reasonable ways,"' 10 9 such as
by requiring taxpayers to defer percentage depletion deductions to years
of actual production or by requiring taxpayers to adjust percentage de-
pletion deductions taken during nonproduction years by filing amended
returns in later tax years. "o The dissent provided two responses. First,
the dissent contended that deferring the deduction entails its own practi-
cal problems with respect to the income limitations of sections 613(a)
and 613A(d)(1).111 Section 613(a) limits percentage depletion to 50% of
the taxpayer's taxable income from the property. 1 2 Section 613A(d)(1)
further limits percentage depletion to 65% of the taxpayer's overall taxa-
ble income. 13 The dissent stated that it was "unclear" how a taxpayer
108. See infra text following note 222.
109. Engle, 464 U.S. at 226.
110. Id. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
111. I.R.C. §§ 613(a), 613A(d)(1) (1982); Engle, 464 U.S. at 230 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
The Internal Revenue Code imposes two separate income limitations upon the oil and gas
percentage depletion allowance. First, § 613(a), supra note 6, limits a taxpayer's percentage
depletion allowance to 50% of his adjusted taxable income derived from any particular oil and
gas interest. Section 613(a) does not provide for a carryover or carryback of any percentage
depletion in excess of this limitation. Thus, if the taxpayer exceeds this limitation in any taxa-
ble year, the excess percentage depletion amount is lost.
Second, § 613A(d)(1), infra note 113, limits a taxpayer's percentage depletion allowance
to 65% of his overall adjusted taxable income. Unlike § 613(a)'s 50% limitation, § 613A(d)(1)
provides that the percentage depletion in excess of the 65% limitation is allowable as a per-
centage depletion deduction in the following taxable year. The statute does not state whether
this excess amount carried over to the following taxable year would once again be subject to
the 50% limitation of § 613(a) or whether the taxpayer must produce oil and gas in the follow-
mng year as a prerequisite to deducting this excess amount. See generally ARTHUR YOUNG'S
OIL & GAS FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, 642-43 (Q. Houghton 22d ed. 1984).
112. I.R.C. § 613(a) (1982). See supra note 6.
113. I.R.C. § 613A(d)(1) (1982). Section 613A(d)(1) (1982) provides, in pertinent part:
The deduction for the taxable year attributable to the application of subsection
(c) shall not exceed 65 percent of the taxpayer's taxable income (reduced in the case
of an individual by the zero bracket amount) for the year computed without regard
to-
(A) any depletion on production from an oil or gas property which is
subject to the provisions of subsection (c),
(B) any net operating loss carryback to the taxable year under section
172,
(C) any capital loss carryback to the taxable year under section 1212, and
(D) in the case of a trust, any distributions to its beneficiary ....
If an amount is disallowed as a deduction for the taxable year by reason of applica-
tion of the preceding sentence, the disallowed amount shall be treated as an amount
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would apply these income limitations when the percentage depletion al-
lowance is reported in a year subsequent to the income that gave rise to
it.114
Second, the majority's assertion that the Commissioner can resolve
such practical problems inverts "the normal rationale for judicial defer-
ence to" the Commissioner. 115 One rationale for the deference rule is
that the Commissioner "is better able than any court, including this one,
to assess the practical consequences of particular interpretations and to
resolve statutory ambiguities in ways that minimize administrative diffi-
culties."11 This rationale notwithstanding, the majority "has embraced
an interpretation whose practical complications the Court itself recog-
nizes and has left the Commissioner to bring order to the confusion that
the Court now has created."
117
The dissent next examined section 613A's legislative history. In a
direct challenge to the majority's view, the dissent found that there is
nothing in the statute's legislative history which would render the Com-
missioner's interpretation unreasonable." 8  Initially, H.R. 21661"9 did
not repeal percentage depletion. On the House floor, the bill was
amended to repeal percentage depletion in its entirety. When the bill
reached the Senate, H.R. 2166 was further amended to exempt small pro-
ducers from the repeal of percentage depletion. 120 Although some sena-
tors sought to completely abolish percentage depletion for small
producers over a five year period, 2' the Senate's final version of the bill
allowable as a deduction under subsection (c) for the following taxable year, subject
to the application of the preceding sentence to such taxable year.
114. Engle, 464 U.S. at 230 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In making this pioint, Justice Black-
mun quoted Judge Fay, who wrote the dissenting opinion (favorable to the taxpayers) at the
Tax Court level. Id. at 230 n.1 (Blackmun, I., dissenting). In his opinion, Judge Fay wrote
that "if income were recognized in one year and percentage depletion deductions calculated on
that income were taken in other years, the amount of deduction limits based on taxable income
found in sees. 613(a) and 613(d)(1) would be nonsensical." Engle v. Commissioner, 76 T.C.
915, 945 n.10 (1981) (Fay, J., dissenting), aft'd, 677 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 46 U.S.
206 (1984). Justice Blackmun added that "[a]t a minimum, the administrative problems would
seem to be multiplied by the allowance carryforward provision of § 613A(d)(1), under which
an allowance that is disallowed by the 65 percent ceiling in one taxable year is carried forward
to subsequent years." Engle, 464 U.S. at 230 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
For further discussion of the practical administrative problems related to these income
limitations, see infra text accompanying notes 238-41.
115. Engle, 464 U.S. at 230 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
116. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
117. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
118. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
119. H.R. 2166, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
120. 121 CONG. REc. 4651-52, 4657-58 (1975).
121. Id. at 7238-39.
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perpetuated percentage depletion for small producers subject to an an-
nual depletable quantity limitation. 122 Subsequently, as a compromise
between the House and Senate versions of the bill, the Conference Com-
mittee retained the Senate's exemption for small producers but scaled
back both the depletable quantity limitation and the depletion rate.
123
Thus, section 613A is the "product" of a major effort by Congress to
completely abolish the percentage depletion allowance on oil and gas. 124
The silence of the legislative record regarding the continued availability
of percentage depletion on preproduction receipts "is hardly compelling
evidence that Congress meant to preserve the status quo in this one inci-
dental respect."'
121
The dissent marshalled three responses to the majority's analysis of
the legislative history. First, the majority relied on the Conference Com-
mittee's use of the word "retains" to conclude that the Senate and the
Conference Committee "expressed a clear intent to retain the percentage
depletion rules as they then existed."' 126 The dissent, however, pointed
out that the use of the word "retains" fails to clarify whether preproduc-
tion receipts are eligible for percentage depletion under section 613A be-
cause section 613A(c) "retains" the percentage depletion allowance for
independent producers and royalty owners regardless of whether physi-
cal extraction is a precondition for the allowance.127
Second, the majority stated that the Senate and Conference Com-
mittee agreed to maintain percentage depletion "in its entirety" for in-
dependent producers and royalty owners who satisfied the various
production limitations of section 613A. 128 The dissent emphatically
pointed out, however, that the majority had merely observed that Con-
gress preserved percentage depletion for those who were not affected by
the changes-"a truism that casts no light on the scope of those
changes."'1
29
Finally, the majority contended that had Congress intended to elim-
inate the pre-1975 rule of allowing percentage depletion on preproduc-
tion receipts it would have explicitly expressed such an intention. 130 The
122. Id. at 7807-08.
123. H. CONF. REP. No. 120, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 68 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 54, 133-34. For text of report, see supra note 68.
124. Engle, 464 U.S. at 231 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 232 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 221 (emphasis in original). See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
127. Engle, 464 U.S. at 232 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
128. Id. at 221. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
129. Engle, 464 U.S. at 232 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 225. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
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dissent, however, retorted that the majority "overlooks not only the haste
in which Congress acted but the extent to which § 613A dismantles the
entire structure of percentage depletion allowances" upon which the pre-
1975 rule rested.1"'
The dissent next examined the congressional purpose underlying
section 613A. The dissent did not assert that the Commissioner's inter-
pretation is consistent with the purpose of the statute. Rather, the dis-
sent contended that the Commissioner's interpretation, which would
limit the total subsidy available to small producers, is at least not "unrea-
sonable or incorrect [because] § 613A on its face achieves the same re-
sult. s13 2 The dissent developed this argument by briefly summarizing
and refuting the majority's analysis.
The majority contended that because section 613A was enacted dur-
ing a period of national concern over energy shortages and dependence
upon foreign oil sources, Congress' fundamental purpose was to increase
domestic production of oil and gas by independent producers and royalty
owners.13  The Commissioner's interpretation of the statute, however,
would ultimately result in less production than that of the rival interpre-
tations because the Commissioner would completely deny the percentage
depletion subsidy related to preproduction receipts. Therefore, accord-
ing to the majority, the Commissioner's interpretation is inconsistent
with the congressional purpose underlying the statute.
1 31
The dissent asserted that the majority's analysis "simply ignores the
terms and structure of the statute that it purports to construe." 13 5 Con-
gress could not have intended the statute to induce independent produ-
cers to increase production. First, the statute merely preserved an old
tax subsidy rather than creating a new one.136 Second, the subsidy pre-
served by the statute was not left intact but rather was deliberately scaled
131. Engle, 464 U.S. at 233 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
132. Id. at 235 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). In a footnote, the dissent
further clarified this point. The dissent noted that it was not suggesting that simply because
Congress limited the percentage depletion allowance for independent producers and royalty
owners with respect to quantity, production processes and rates, Congress must also have
intended to repeal percentage depletion on preproduction receipts. Rather, the dissent was
contending that the fact that Congress substantially limited percentage depletion for independ-
ent producers and royalty owners "makes it impossible to dismiss the Commissioner's inter-
pretation of § 613A as 'unreasonable' on the ground that it provides a smaller incentive than
rival interpretations." Id. at 235 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 217-18. See supra text accompanying notes 59-60.
134. Engle, 464 U.S. at 218-19. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
135. Engle, 464 U.S. at 234 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
136. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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back. 137 Therefore, the dissent concluded, "the fact that Congress sub-
stantially limited pre-existing incentives for independent producers
makes it impossible to dismiss the Commissioner's interpretation of
§ 613A as 'unreasonable' on the ground that it provides a smaller incen-
tive than rival interpretations."
13 8
2. Methodology
In Part II of its analysis, the dissent criticized the majority's meth-
odological approach to interpreting federal tax law. Although the major-
ity purported to uphold the rule that the "'choice among reasonable
interpretations [of federal tax law] is for the Commissioner, not the
courts,'" the majority's rejection of the Commissioner's interpretation
fails to comply with this rule on two counts.139 First, Justice Blackmun
observed that the Commissioner's interpretation is compatible with the
statute's language and history of legislative compromise, and with the
percentage depletion restrictions placed on small producers."4 Second,
the Commissioner's interpretation does not produce the kinds of practi-
cal complications produced by the rival interpretations embraced by the
majority."4 Thus, the dissent asserted, the majority "has chosen to
honor the rule in the breach."142 Therefore, the dissent opposed the deci-
sion of the majority not simply with respect to "an interpretation of a
discrete section of the Internal Revenue Code but ... [also with respect
to] the Court's willingness to displace the Commissioner's interpretation
of the tax laws with its own views of tax policy." '43
III. ANALYSIS
A. Historical Framework
Over fifty years ago, the Supreme Court held in Burnet v. Harmel
44
that advance royalty and lease bonus receipts constituted depletable in-
come.14 The Court deemed that such income was attributable to future
production of minerals rather than to amounts realized from the sale or
137. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See infra notes 208-14 and accompanying text.
138. Engle, 464 U.S. at 235 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 224 (quoting National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 488
(1979)). See supra text accompanying note 90.
140. Engle, 464 U.S. at 236 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
141. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 228 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 236-37 (Blackmun, 5., dissenting).
144. 287 U.S. 103 (1932).
145. Id. at 111-12. For a discussion of the historic background of the depletion allowance
in general, see Note, supra note 21, at 1083-89; Baker, supra note 9, at 268-71.
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exchange of minerals in place. 146 Prior to the enactment of section 613A
by the Tax Reduction Act of 1975, it was well settled that the depletable
income arising from advance royalties and lease bonuses was eligible for
either cost depletion or percentage depletion. In Palmer v. Bender,147 the
Court allowed percentage depletion on an advance royalty, noting that
the advance royalty was "a return pro-tanto of [the lessor's] capital in-
vestment in the oil, in anticipation of its extraction."14 In Herring v.
Commissioner,149 the Court allowed percentage depletion on a lease bo-
nus, noting that the bonus was a "payment in advance for oil and gas to
be extracted."15
Under the pre-1975 law, however, percentage depletion on advance
royalty and lease bonus receipts eventually had to be attributed to actual
production by both lessors and lessees. The Treasury Department
promulgated regulations by which lessors would restore depletion al-
lowances previously deducted to income in the event that the lessee failed
to extract minerals or left minerals remaining in the ground.' The
Treasury promulgated additional regulations requiring lessees to exclude
advance royalty and lease bonus amounts previously paid to lessors from
146. Burnet, 287 U.S. at 111-12.
147. 287 U.S. 551 (1933).
148. Id. at 559.
149. 293 U.S. 322 (1934).
150. Id. at 324.
151. Treas. Reg. § 1.612-3(a)(2), -3(b)(2) (1960).
Treas. Reg. § 1.612-3(a)(2) (1960), concerning the restoration of bonus lease payments,
provides in pertinent part:
If the grant of an economic interest in a mineral deposit... with respect to
which a bonus was received expires, terminates, or is abandoned before there has
been any income derived from the extraction of mineral ... ,the payee shall adjust
his capital account by restoring thereto the depletion deduction taken on the bonus
and a corresponding amount must be returned as income in the year of such expira-
tion, termination, or abandonment.
Thus, in the case of percentage depletion taken on lease bonuses, the lessor avoids restoring
any portion of the depletion deduction under this regulation as long as some amount of actual
mineral production occurs.
Treas. Reg. § 1.612-3(b)(2) (1960), concerning the restoration of advance royalty pay-
ments, provides in pertinent part:
If the right to extract minerals ... against which the advanced royalties may be
applied expires, terminates, or is abandoned before all such minerals... have been
extracted . . . , the payee shall adjust his capital account by restoring thereto the
depletion deductions made in prior years on account of any units of mineral... paid
for in advance but not extracted ... ,and a corresponding amount must be returned
as income for the year of such expiration, termination or abandonment.
Thus, in the case of percentage depletion taken on advance royalties, the Treasury Regulations
provide that the lessor must restore to income the portion of his depletion deduction corre-
sponding to the amount of mineral units remaining in the ground during the year that the right
to extract minerals expires or is abandoned. See Douglas v. Commissioner, 322 U.S. 275, 284
(1944).
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their depletable income arising from mineral production. By means of
this exclusion, the total income produced by an oil and gas interest would
be available for only one percentage depletion deduction.
15 2
The Tax Reduction Act of 1975 added section 613A to the Internal
Revenue Code.15 Section 613A generally repealed percentage depletion
on oil and gas production except for certain "independent producers and
royalty owners."1"4 For this favored class of producers, the statute al-
152. Treas. Reg. § 1.613-2(c)(5)(ii), T.D. 7261, 1973-1 C.B. 309, 317, -2(c)(5)(iii) (1960).
Treas. Reg. § 1.613-2(c)(5)(ii), T.D. 7261, 1973-1 C.B. 309, 317, concerning an exclusion
generated by a lease bonus, provides in pertinent part:
If bonus payments have been paid in respect of the property in any taxable
year or any prior taxable years, there shall be excluded in determining the "gross
income from the property," an amount equal to that part of such payments which is
allocable to the product sold (or otherwise giving rise to gross income) for the taxable
year.
Treas. Reg. § 1.613-2(c)(5)(ii), T.D. 7261, 1973-1 C.B. 309, 317 provides the following exam-
ple to illustrate this rule:
In 1956, A leases oil bearing lands to B, receiving $200,000 as a bonus and
reserving a royalty of one-eighth of the proceeds of all oil produced and sold. It is
estimated at the time the lease is entered into that there are 1,000,000 barrels of oil
recoverable. In 1956, B produces and sells 100,000 barrels for $240,000. In comput-
ing his "gross income from the property" [with respect to calculating B's allowable
percentage depletion] for the year 1956, B will exclude $30,000 (1/8 of $240,000), the
royalty paid to A, and $20,000 (100,000 bbls. sold/1,000,000 bbls. estimated to be
available X $200,000 bonus), the portion of the bonus allocable to the oil produced
and sold during the year. However, in computing B's taxable income under section
63, the $20,000 attributable to the bonus payment shall not be either excluded or
deducted from B's gross income computed under section 61.
Id. § 1.613-2(c)(5)(ii) (Example (1)).
Treas. Reg. § 1.613-2(c)(5)(iii) (1960), dealing with an exclusion generated by an advance
royalty, provides in pertinent part:
If advanced royalties have been paid in respect of the property in any taxable
year, the amount excluded from "gross income from the property" of the payor for
the current taxable year on account of such payment, shall be an amount equal to the
deduction for such taxable year taken on account of such payment ....
Treas. Reg. § 1.613-2(c)(5)(iil) (1960) provides the following example to illustrate this rule:
If B. .. elects to deduct in 1956 the $10,000 paid [as an advance royalty] to A in
that year, [B] must exclude the same amount from "gross income from the property"
[with respect to calculating B's allowable percentage depletion] in 1956; however, if
B elects to defer the deduction [for the advance royalty payment] until 1957 when he
mined and sold the mineral, he must exclude the $10,000 from "gross income from
the property" [with respect to calculating B's allowable percentage depletion] in
1957.
Id. § 1.613-2(c)(5)(iil) (Example). See Helvering v. Twin Bell Oil Syndicate, 293 U.S. 312, 321
(1934).
153. Pub. L. No. 94-12, 89 Stat. 26 (1975) (applying to taxable years ending after December
31, 1974).
154. As a result of the 1973 OPEC oil embargo and four-fold increase in the price of crude
oil, the major integrated oil companies were reaping excessive oil and gas profits. These com-
panies were reinvesting little of their concomitant tax depletion subsidies in domestic energy
exploration and production. Landis, supra note 9, at 1061-62. Congress responded to the
situation in the Tax Reduction Act of 1975 by adding section 613A to the Internal Revenue
Code. Id.
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lows a percentage depletion deduction only with respect to a "depletable
oil quantity" limitation which is a specified annual volume of produc-
tion."'5 In defining the depletable oil quantity, the statute repeatedly re-
fers to "production." 156 Section 613A imposes a further limitation on
taxpayers who are eligible for the allowance. Section 613A(d)(1) pro-
vides that the allowable depletion deduction "shall not exceed 65 percent
of the taxpayer's taxable income."
15 7
These new limitations along with the statute's repeated reference to
"production" raised the issue as to whether percentage depletion is al-
lowable during a taxable year within which payments for oil and gas
production are received in advance of any actual production. In the case
of an advance royalty, the actual production for which prepayment is
received often occurs in a later taxable year." 8 In the case of a lease
bonus, there is no actual production requirement under the lease.159
In Proposed Treasury Regulations section 1.613A-7(f)(1) 1 ° and
Revenue Ruling 81-44,161 the IRS construed section 613A to preclude
percentage depletion on advance royalty and lease bonus receipts.1 62 On
155. I.R.C. § 613A(c)(3) (1982 & Supp. 1984).
156. Id. § 613A(c).
157. Id. § 613A(d)(1) (1982). See supra note 113.
158. For further discussion of advance royalties, see supra note 20.
159. For further discussion of lease bonuses, see supra note 21.
160. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.613A-7(f(1), 42 Fed. Reg. 24,287 (1977) provides, in pertinent
part:
[I]n computing the average daily production for a taxable year only oil or gas which
has been produced by the close of such taxable year shall be taken into account. For
example, advanced royalties (to the extent that actual production during the taxable
year is insufficient to earn such royalties) and lease bonuses, while taken into account
for purposes of sections 61 and 612 (relating to the definition of gross income and
cost depletion, respectively), would not be taken into account in computing the per-
centage depletion allowance pursuant to section 613A(c).
161. Rev. Rul. 81-44, 1981-1 C.B. 384 provides, in pertinent part:
ISSUE
Under the exemption for independent producers and royalty owners in section
613A(c) of the Internal Revenue Code is percentage depletion allowable on an oil
and gas lease bonus?
Percentage depletion under section 613A(c) of the Code is allowable only with
respect to production. The payment of the described lease bonus was independent of
whether there was production from the lease.
Lease bonuses, while taken into account for purposes of section [sic] 61 and 612
of the Code (relating to the definition of gross income and cost depletion, respec-
tively), are not to be taken into account in computing the percentage depletion allow-
ance pursuant to section 613A(c).
Id. (emphasis in original).
162. A concise exposition of the position of the IRS is restated by the Tax Court in Engle as
follows:
In support of his position, [the Commissioner] emphasizes the language in section
613A(c)(1) stating that the allowance for depletion... shall be computed in accord-
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several occasions taxpayers challenged the IRS's position in the federal
courts.163 Finally, in October, 1983, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari in the consolidated case of Commissioner v. Engle.1'"
B. Analysis of the Decision
The first issue before the Engle Court was whether the language of
section 613A limiting percentage depletion to stated quantities of pro-
duction was intended to (1) establish a limit on the amount of such deple-
tion which the taxpayer may claim or (2) establish production within the
taxable year as a prerequisite to any deduction.16s  The taxpayers
adopted the former viewpoint. 166 The Commissioner adopted the latter
viewpoint. 167 Both the majority and the dissent analyzed this issue in
terms of section 613A's language, legislative history, purpose and practi-
cal problems of administration.
A second issue of equal importance was one of methodology in adju-
dicating tax law disputes. Relying on a dissenting opinion, 161 the major-
ity stated that the Court's "duty then is 'to find that interpretation which
ance with section 613 only "with respect to... so much of the taxpayer's average
daily production" of domestic crude oil or natural gas as does not exceed the deplet-
able oil and natural gas quantities specified in section 613A(c)(3) and (4). [The Com-
missioner] reasons that petitioners, having no "average daily production" of oil or
natural gas for 1975, have nothing with respect to which percentage depletion may be
computed in accordance with section 613.
Engle v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 915, 920 (1981) (emphasis in original).
163. Engle v. Commissioner, 677 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1982); Farmar v. United States, 689
F.2d 1017 (Ct. Cl. 1982); Glass v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 949 (1981).
164. 459 U.S. 1102 (1983).
165. Commissioner v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206, 215-16 (1984).
166. Id. at 216.
167. Id. at 215-16.
168. NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282, 297 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). The majority's reliance upon Justice Frankfurter's principle of
"find[ing] that interpretation which can most fairly be said to be embedded in the statute, in
the sense of being most harmonious with its scheme and.., general purposes" is problematic.
Id. (Frankfurter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In Lion Oil, the Court was
construing § 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act under Title 29 of the United States
Code. Id. at 283. The task before the Engle Court was that of construing a discrete section of
the Internal Revenue Code. The Internal Revenue Code has its own body of principles of
construction, separate from other Titles of the United States Code. For further discussion, see
infra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
Further, Justice Frankfurter in Lion Oil set forth this principle in the dissenting portion of
his opinion while noting that the National Labor Relations Board itself was divided three ways
with respect to interpreting § 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act. Lion Oil, 352 U.S. at
297 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Thus, "[s]uch diverse interpre-
tations, particularly by the authorities charged with the administration of the Act," mandate the
"judicial responsibility to find that interpretation which can most fairly be said to be embedded
in the statute." Id. (Frankfurter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis
added). In Engle, however, there was no evidence of disagreement within the Internal Reve-
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can most fairly be said to be imbedded in the statute, in the sense of being
most harmonious with its scheme and with the general purposes that
Congress manifested.' "169 Thus, the majority took upon itself the task
of discovering which interpretation, that of the Commissioner's or that of
the taxpayers', most reasonably fits the statute.
The majority's approach is at odds with the Court's traditional ap-
proach to adjudicating tax law disputes. Under the traditional approach,
the Court has repeatedly affirmed the principle that "the 'choice among
reasonable interpretations is for the Commissioner, not the courts.' "170
Thus, even if other interpretations of a tax statute are more reasonable
than that of the Commissioner's, as long as the Commissioner's interpre-
tation is not unreasonable, the Court, under its traditional approach, will
defer to the Commissioner's interpretation. 171 Although the majority
nue Service, the authority charged with the administration of federal tax law, that § 613A
repealed percentage depletion on preproduction oil and gas receipts.
169. Engle, 464 U.S. at 217 (quoting NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 292, 297 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
170. Id. at 224 (quoting National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 488
(1979)).
Under I.R.C. § 7805(a) (1982), Congress delegated to the Commissioner, and therefore
not to the courts, the role of prescribing "all needful rules and regulations for the enforce-
ment" of the Internal Revenue Code. The Court has stated that this delegation was intended
to insure that the taxation rules and regulations will be written by the "'masters of the sub-
ject' " who will be enforcing them. National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S.
472, 477 (1979) (quoting United States v. Moore, 95 U.S. 760, 763 (1878)). The Court has
firmly established the well settled principle that "Treasury regulations must be sustained un-
less unreasonable and plainly inconsistent with the revenue statutes." Commissioner v. South
Tex. Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948). The Court will presume that Treasury regulations
are valid if they "implement the congressional mandate in some reasonable manner." United
States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307 (1967). In National Muffler, the Court set forth the follow-
ing test when evaluating the validity of a particular Treasury regulation:
In determining whether a particular regulation carries out the congressional
mandate in a proper manner, we look to see whether the regulation harmonizes with
the plain language of the statute, its origin, and its purpose. A regulation may have
particular force if it is a substantially contemporaneous construction of the statute by
those presumed to have been aware of congressional intent. If the regulation dates
from a later period, the manner in which it evolved merits inquiry. Other relevant
considerations are the length of time the regulation has been in effect, the reliance
placed on it, the consistency of the Commissioner's interpretation, and the degree of
scrutiny Congress has devoted to the regulation during subsequent re-enactments of
the statute.
National Muffler, 440 U.S. at 477 (citing Commissioner v. South Tex. Lumber Co., 333 U.S.
496, 501 (1948); Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 (1938)).
171. This principle is stated in terms of a negative test of the Court finding whether the
Commissioner's interpretation is unreasonable. Thus, the Commissioner's interpretation is en-
titled to prevail as long as it is not "unreasonable and plainly inconsistent" with the federal tax
statutes. Commissioner v. South Tex. Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948). The difference
between stating this principle in a positive versus a negative test lies in the nature of the task
facing the Court. Must the Court find the Commissioner's interpretation unreasonable and
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later purported to accept the principle of deference to the Commis-
sioner's interpretation, 172 the majority failed to address the conflict be-
tween the Court's traditional approach and the majority's professed duty
of discovering that interpretation which is most harmonious with the
statute.
The dissent unequivocally embraced the principle that "the 'choice
among reasonable interpretations is for the Commissioner, not for the
courts.' ",173 Thus the dissent did not compare the reasonableness of each
possible interpretation of the statute. Rather, the dissent merely sought
to determine whether the Commissioner's interpretation was unreasona-
ble. Hence, the dissent's chief contention against the majority was that
the majority simply failed to establish that the Commissioner's interpre-
tation was, in fact, "unreasonable and plainly inconsistent" with the stat-
ute.174 All considerations, including the statute's language, legislative
history, purpose and practical problems of administration reasonably
support the Commissioner's interpretation of the statute. Although these
four considerations could be read to support the taxpayers' interpreta-
tion, none of these considerations mandates invalidation of the Commis-
sioner's interpretation. This provides the conceptual basis for the
dissent's observation that the majority's decision is "a sign of the Court's
willingness to displace the Commissioner's interpretation of the tax laws
with its own views of tax policy." '175
1. Statutory language
The majority explored the following three possible interpretations of
section 613A, noting that each interpretation may be reconciled with the
language of the statute: (1) the statute's repeated reference to "produc-
tion" and "taxable year" supports the Commissioner's interpretation that
the statute requires production within the taxable year as a prerequisite
to taking the percentage depletion allowance; (2) the statute's reference
to "average daily production" supports the taxpayers' interpretation by
establishing a limitation on the amount rather than a prerequisite to the
plainly inconsistent with the statute before displacing the Commissioner's interpretation of the
statute with the Court's interpretation? Or, more easily, must the Court fail to find the Com-
missioner's interpretation reasonable, but short of finding the Commissioner's interpretation
"unreasonable and plainly inconsistent" with the statute? Under the traditional approach, the
Court has taken upon itself the former task.
172. Engle, 464 U.S. at 224.
173. Id. at 236 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v.
United States, 440 U.S. 472, 488 (1979)).
174. Id. at 228 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 236-37 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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deduction and allows the depletion deduction during the taxable year
within which the income is received rather than in the taxable year of
actual oil and gas production; and (3) the statute's reference to "average
daily production," while limiting the amount of the deduction, defers the
deduction to the taxable year of actual oil and gas production.
176
In the Court's search for that interpretation which is most harmoni-
ous with the statute, the majority pointed out that although the statute
bars percentage depletion on income attributable to production over cer-
tain levels, nothing in the statute bars percentage depletion attributable
to preproduction receipts.177 Based on this observation, the majority
concluded that percentage depletion on preproduction receipts falls
"within the four corners" of the statute. 17  Thus, because the statute's
language does not expressly bar percentage depletion on preproduction
receipts, the statute must permit it.
The statute's silence with respect to percentage depletion on
preproduction receipts, however, may just as plausibly indicate the oppo-
site conclusion. Congress had initially intended to repeal completely per-
centage depletion on oil and gas production. 179 The final version of the
bill provided for several specific exemptions from the broad repeal.' 80
Hence, it is at least equally logical to conclude that because there was no
specific provision for percentage depletion on preproduction receipts in
the final version of the bill, Congress must have intended to bar percent-
age depletion on preproduction receipts as part of a broad legislative re-
peal of percentage depletion on oil and gas production. Therefore, the
majority's pregnant silence argument is not persuasive.' 8'
The majority's analysis is troubled by two additional weaknesses.
176. See supra notes 47-58 and accompanying text.
177. Engle, 464 U.S. at 224.
178. Id.
179. See 121 Cong. Rec. 4651-52, 4657-58 (1975).
180. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text. The structure of § 613A reflects this
history. Section 613A(a) (1982) begins with the general rule of repealing percentage depletion
on oil and gas production by providing that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section, the
allowance for depletion under section 611 with respect to any oil or gas well shall be computed
without regard to section 613." Sections 613A(b) and (c) then provide for specific exemptions
from this broad repeal. Id. § 613A(b)-(c) (1982 & Supp. 1984).
181. The majority later buttressed its position by stating that "[h]ad Congress meant to
eliminate the percentage depletion allowance on lease bonus and advance royalty income, we
believe it would have addressed our decisions to the contrary more explicitly." Engle, 464 U.S.
at 225 (citing Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 289 (1956)). Still, given the broad
scope of the repeal of percentage depletion under § 613A and the congressional haste under
which the statute was enacted, it is reasonable that Congress intended to accomplish an across
the board repeal of percentage depletion with the exception of the selective exemptions specifi-
cally provided by the statute.
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First, the majority purports to read the statute within the context of the
"related sections" of the Internal Revenue Code.182 However, the major-
ity fails to accomplish this end. When reading the statute's requirement
that percentage depletion on oil and gas will be calculated with respect to
"average daily production" defined in terms of "aggregate production...
during the taxable year,"'183 the majority ignores the Internal Revenue
Code's explicit definition of "taxable year." As the dissent has ob-
served, 1 4 Internal Revenue Code section 7701(a)(23) defines "taxable
year" in terms of "the calendar year, or the fiscal year... upon the basis
of which the taxable income is computed" with respect to income
taxes. 5 Therefore, under section 613A, in the absence of "aggregate
production... during the taxable year," the statute provides no basis
upon which to compute any percentage depletion.
Second, the majority creates a paradox by acknowledging that the
Commissioner's interpretation is reconcilable with the language of the
statute'86 while later concluding that the Commissioner's interpretation
is unreasonable." 7 Nowhere does the majority explain how the Commis-
sioner's interpretation is reconcilable with the language of the statute, yet
still unreasonable.
188
2. Legislative history
The majority and the dissent extensively reviewed the legislative his-
182. Id. at 223.
183. I.R.C. § 613A(c)(1)-(2) (1982) (emphasis added).
184. Engle, 464 U.S. at 229 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
185. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(23) (1982).
186. Engle, 464 U.S. at 217.
187. Id. at 224. With respect to analyzing the statute's language, the majority focused its
efforts on discovering that interpretation which is in greatest harmony with the language of the
statute. The majority offered no evidence indicating that the Commissioner's interpretation
was unreasonable. Hence, the most that can be concluded from the majority's analysis is that
the Commissioner's interpretation is reasonable though less harmonious with the language of
the statute than that of the taxpayers' interpretation.
188. A passage from English literature may aid in resolving such paradoxes:
"I don't know what you mean by 'glory,'" Alice said.
Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. "Of course you don't-till I tell you.
I meant 'there's a nice knock-down argument for youl'"
"But 'glory' doesn't mean 'a nice knock-down argument,"' Alice objected.
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone, "it
means just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less."
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many
different things."
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be the master-that's
all."
L. CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS 245 (Rainbow Classics ed. 1946) (emphasis in
original).
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tory of section 613A. They both observed that Congress, in enacting the
Tax Reduction Act of 1975, acted in haste.'8 9 From their similar obser-
vations, they drew diametrically opposed conclusions.
The majority contended that because most depletion deductions are
based on actual production, "Congress, in its haste,"19 imposed upon
that class of taxpayers exempted from the percentage depletion repeal a
maximum depletable allowance defined in terms of ceiling levels of pro-
duction. 191 The majority thus implied that but for the haste under which
Congress was acting, Congress would have also expressly provided,
either in the statute or in the committee reports, a percentage depletion
allowance for the comparatively smaller amount of depletion deductions
based upon preproduction receipts. The dissent retorted that the fact
that Congress failed to specifically bar percentage depletion on
preproduction receipts overlooks "the haste" in which Congress acted.' 92
The dissent thus implied that had Congress acted with less haste it would
have expressly repealed percentage depletion on preproduction receipts.
Because the argument of congressional haste supports the positions of
both the majority and the dissent, the argument ultimately proves
inconclusive.
The majority probed the legislative history further, looking for any
indication that Congress intended to retain percentage depletion on
preproduction receipts. In examining the committee reports, the major-
ity noted that the repeal of percentage depletion on preproduction re-
ceipts was never suggested.193 Further, the majority found significance in
the Conference Committee's report that stated that the proposed legisla-
189. Engle, 464 U.S. at 224; id. at 233 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 204.
191. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
The majority wrote that Congress "defined the class of taxpayers exempted from the per-
centage depletion repeal in terms of certain production levels." Engle, 464 U.S. at 224 (empha-
sis added). This is not the case. I.R.C. § 613A(b) (1982) defines those taxpayers exempted
from the repeal in terms of the type of oil and gas produced irrespective of production levels.
I.R.C. § 613A(c) (1982) defines those taxpayers exempted from the repeal in terms of their
status as independent producer or royalty owner. The statute does not define independent
producers or royalty owners in terms of production levels. Rather, the statute provides that all
oil and gas producers shall have the status of independent producer or royalty owner other
than those producers who are also gas retailers and refiners as defined under I.R.C.
§ 613A(d)(2) (1982). Once a taxpayer has acquired the exempt status of independent producer
or royalty owner by refraining from or ceasing retail and refinery operations, then the taxpayer
is subject to a production level limitation. If the taxpayer exceeds the production level limita-
tion, the taxpayer still retains his exempt status. The taxpayer's percentage depletion allow-
ance is simply limited by the production level ceiling.
192. Engle, 464 U.S. at 233 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 220.
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tion "retains percentage depletion ... for the small independent pro-
ducer." '194 The majority interpreted the use of the word "retains" as
implying that Congress intended to retain percentage depletion "in its
entirety" for independent producers and royalty owners.195
The use of the word "retains" in the Conference Committee report
sheds no light on precisely what Congress intended to retain. 96 The fact
that the broad scope of the legislation was intended to repeal percentage
depletion on oil and gas production while providing for only two specific
exemptions from the repeal' 97 indicates that the scope of the exemptions
should be construed narrowly.
The majority found further support for its position by contending
that had Congress intended to eliminate percentage depletion on
preproduction receipts it would have addressed the Court's prior deci-
sions to the contrary more explicitly.198 This argument has two weak-
nesses. First, the majority implies that Congress failed to expressly
address the issue of percentage depletion on preproduction receipts in the
1975 Act. However, the majority earlier observed that Congress "ex-
pressed a clear intent to retain the percentage depletion rules" on
preproduction receipts by the use of the word "retains" in the Confer-
ence Committee report. 199 The majority cannot logically argue the issue
of expressed congressional intent from all directions. If Congress ex-
pressed its intent to retain percentage depletion on preproduction re-
ceipts by means of the word "retains," as asserted by the majority, then it
is not logical for the majority also to contend that Congress would have
addressed the Court's prior decisions to the contrary more explicitly.
Second, the majority once again found Congress' silence as a persua-
sive indicator of congressional intent to preserve the status quo. This
view presumes that the enactment of section 613A represents only a
small increment of change to the body of percentage depletion law. The
broad scope of the repeal, however, suggests otherwise."° As the dissent
has noted, section 613A actually "dismantles the entire structure of per-
centage depletion allowances" with respect to oil and gas production
194. Id. at 221 (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 120, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 67-68 (1975)
reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 54, 132 (emphasis added by the Court)).
For text of report, see supra note 68.
195. Engle, 464 U.S. at 221.
196. Indeed, one author has concluded that the "Conference Report... is of no real assist-
ance in interpreting... section [613A]." Bravenec, Continued Availability of Percentage De-
pletion on Oil and Gas, 23 OIL & GAs TAX Q. 204, 204 (1975).
197. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
198. Engle, 464 U.S. at 225.
199. Id. at 221.
200. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
COMMISSIONER v. ENGLE
upon which the prior law rested.z 1
3. Congressional purpose
On its face, Congress' purpose in enacting section 613A was to re-
peal percentage depletion on oil and gas production with the exceptions
of production generated by certain domestic gas wells and by independ-
ent producers and royalty owners.2 '2 Although the dissent suggested no
other purpose for the legislation beyond this point,20 3 the majority main-
tained that Congress had in mind an additional purpose.
The majority asserted that Congress sought to spur domestic oil and
gas production by retaining the percentage depletion allowance for in-
dependent producers and royalty owners. 2 ' The allowance would thus
"subsidize... the exploration and production of the Nation's oil and gas
resources," thereby increasing domestic production and severing the na-
tion's dependence on imported oil.2 "5 Furthermore, because section
613A rendered the percentage depletion allowance no longer available to
the major integrated oil companies, the majority asserted that Congress
intended to improve the competitive position of independent producers
and royalty owners vis-a-vis the major integrated oil companies.20 6 The
majority concluded that because the Commissioner's position would re-
sult in a smaller amount of percentage depletion available to independent
producers and royalty owners,20 7 his position conflicted with Congress'
purpose in enacting the statute.
The majority's assertion is at odds with the practical implications of
the statute. Prior to the enactment of section 613A, the percentage de-
pletion allowance was available to all oil and gas producers under section
613.208 With the passage of section 613A, Congress eliminated the per-
centage depletion allowance for the major integrated oil companies
which accounted for more than 70% of all oil and gas production.20 9
With respect to independent producers and royalty owners who re-
mained eligible for the percentage depletion allowance, section 613A(c)
limited their deduction in 1975 to a maximum average daily production
201. Engle, 464 U.S. at 233 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
202. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
203. Engle, 464 U.S. at 233-36 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 217-18.
205. Id. at 218.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 218-19.
208. Landis, supra note 9, at 1060-61. For further discussion, see supra note 154 and ac-
companying text.
209. Landis, supra note 9, at 1062.
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of depletable oil of 2,000 barrels.210 This depletable quantity limitation
was scaled back even further over a five year period, beginning with
1976, to a maximum average daily production of 1,000 barrels for the
year 1980 and thereafter.211  The percentage depletion rate was also
scaled back over a ten year period from 22% in 1975 to 15% in 1984 and
thereafter.21 2  Hence, the practical impact of section 613A was to se-
verely reduce the amount of percentage depletion subsidy available to all
oil and gas producers with the greatest portion of the reduction occurring
in 1975.
Given the total repeal of the percentage depletion subsidy for major
integrated oil companies and the severe reduction of the subsidy for in-
dependent producers and royalty owners, Congress could not have ra-
tionally expected to increase domestic production through the enactment
of section 613A.21 3 Therefore, the Commissioner's position does not fail
210. I.RC. § 613A(c)(3)(B) (1982).
211. Id.
212. Id. § 613A(c)(5) (1982).
213. For example, suppose that in 1974 an independent producer was pumping oil from the
ground at the average rate of 5,000 barrels per day with a fair market value of $20 per barrel.
Further, assume that for the years beyond 1974, the market value of the producer's oil held
steady in terms of 1974 dollars. Table I, below, illustrates the declining percentage depletion
subsidy available to such an independent producer before and after the enactment of section
613A.
Table I: Analysis of the Declining Percentage Depletion Subsidy Available to
Independent Producers and Royalty Owners
Year Barrels X Days per X Fair Market X Percentage - Depletion
per day year Value Depletion Rate Subsidy
allowable
1974 *5000 365 $20.00 .22 $8,030,000
1975 2000 365 20.00 .22 3,212,000
1976 1800 365 20.00 .22 2,890,800
1977 1600 365 20.00 .22 2,569,600
1978 1400 365 20.00 .22 2,248,400
1979 1200 365 20.00 .22 1,927,200
1980 1000 365 20.00 .22 1,606,000
1981 1000 365 20.00 .20 1,460,000
1982 1000 365 20.00 .18 1,314,000
1983 1000 365 20.00 .16 1,168,000
1984 1000 365 20.00 .15 1,095,000
* There is no statutory depletable quantity limitation with respect to 1974.
As the table indicates, an independent producer, who produced oil and gas at an average barrel
per day rate in excess of the amount allowed by section 613A during the years 1974 through
1984, would experience a substantial reduction in the maximum allowable percentage deple-
tion subsidy. The greatest decrease in the annual allowable percentage depletion subsidy
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on the grounds that it resulted in a smaller subsidy available to independ-
ent producers and royalty owners because the statute itself accomplishes
this same end.214
The majority further argued that percentage depletion on
preproduction receipts is an essential component of the risk spreading
arrangement between lessors and lessees. Under this arrangement, les-
sors, who are generally risk averse, would be willing to accept smaller
preproduction payments from lessees on oil and gas leases because of the
subsidy provided by percentage depletion. The majority thus observed
that, in effect, lessors pass through to lessees a portion of the economic
benefit arising from the percentage depletion allowance on preproduction
receipts. With lessees making smaller preproduction payments on leases,
lessees would have more available capital to finance their exploration and
development, which in turn would result in increased domestic produc-
tion.21 Conversely, the Commissioner's position of denying percentage
depletion on preproduction receipts would force lessors to require larger
payments from lessees which ultimately would result in lessees devoting
less capital to domestic exploration and development. 21 6 Thus, accord-
ing to the majority, the Commissioner's position once again fails to har-
monize with Congress' purpose of increasing domestic production.
To the extent that major integrated oil companies are included
among the lessees who enter into the risk spreading arrangements envi-
sioned by the majority, these arrangements would result in passing
through to major integrated oil companies the benefits of the percentage
depletion allowance. Such a result is clearly not in harmony with the
congressional purpose behind the statute. As the majority acknowledged
at the outset of its opinion, the primary purpose of the statute was to
deny the benefits of percentage depletion to the major integrated oil com-
panies. 217 Thus, the majority's interpretation-which promotes risk
spreading arrangements between small lessors and large lessees-would
defeat the statute's primary purpose of denying percentage depletion to
major integrated oil companies. Conversely, the Commissioner's inter-
pretation-which discourages risk spreading arrangements-would en-
would occur between the transition from the years 1974 to 1975. The average annual rate of
decrease provided by the statute during the years 1975 to 1984 computes to 12.7%. The over-
all percentage decrease of the percentage depletion allowance from 1975 to 1984 computes to
65.9%.
214. See generally Bravenec, Decreased Significance of Percentage Depletion on Oil and Gas,
23 OIL & GAs TAX Q. 193 (1975).
215. Engle, 464 U.S. at 218-19.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 211. See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.
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hance the statute's primary purpose of denying percentage depletion to
major integrated oil companies by preventing the economic benefits of
percentage depletion on preproduction receipts from passing through to
major integrated oil companies.
Furthermore, contrary to the majority's analysis, allowing percent-
age depletion on preproduction receipts may actually result in less do-
mestic production. Because the subsidy makes it less expensive for
lessees to enter into leasing arrangements that provide for deferred pro-
duction, percentage depletion on preproduction receipts would subsidize
the lessees' holding costs of the lease. Lessees thus would be provided
with an incentive to defer production in hopes that the market value of
oil and gas left in the ground would appreciate. Lessees would proceed
with production of oil and gas only at such time when the present value
of the additional holding costs of the preproduction payments exceeds
the present value of the additional profit potential from future apprecia-
tion of the oil and gas in the ground.2 8 Therefore, assuming arguendo
that Congress, by means of enacting section 613A, sought to immediately
increase domestic production by means of the percentage depletion sub-
sidy, it is not at all clear that allowing percentage depletion on
preproduction receipts would accomplish this end.
4. Practical problems of administration
Both the majority and the dissent recognized the practical problems
of administration related to allowing percentage depletion on preproduc-
tion receipts.219 The administrative problems arise from attempting to
relate preproduction receipts received in earlier taxable years to deplet-
able quantity limitations, percentage of income limitations, rates of per-
centage depletion and types of production processes arising in later
218. For example, suppose in 1980 a lessee entered into a 20 year lease with respect to oil
and gas property containing an estimated one million barrels of oil reserves in the ground. At
that time, the fair market value of the oil, once in the pipeline, was $20 per barrel for a total
amount of $20,000,000. Further, assume the lessee obligated himself to pay the lessor an
advance royalty of $50,000 per year for each year in which the lessee failed to produce oil from
the ground. Hence, the holding cost of the lease for the lessee would be $50,000 per year. If
the lessee expected the oil in the ground to appreciate at the rate of 5% per year, then the
lessee would experience a $50,000 gain from the appreciation value of the oil in the ground
which would be offset by the $50,000 holding cost of the lease. Hence, the lessee would be
indifferent as to whether he should produce oil currently or defer production. If, however, the
lessee expected the oil in the ground to appreciate at a rate of 10% per year, then the lessee
would experience a $100,000 gain from the appreciation value of the oil in the ground. Since
the lessee's holding cost of the lease is only $50,000 per year, the lessee would have a strong
financial incentive to defer production for as long as possible under the lease in order to maxi-
mize his profit potential from the appreciation value of the oil in the ground.
219. See supra notes 85-88 & 106-17 and accompanying texts.
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taxable years. 220 The majority asserted that the administrative problems
could be overcome by the Commissioner promulgating regulations re-
quiring taxpayers to defer percentage depletion deductions to years of
actual production or by requiring taxpayers to adjust percentage deple-
tion deductions taken during nonproduction years by filing amended re-
turns in later taxable years. 221 The dissent was less optimistic than the
majority, indicating that it was unclear how a taxpayer would apply the
50% and 65% income limitations provided under sections 613(a) and
613A(d)(1) when the percentage depletion allowance is reported in a year
subsequent to the income that gave rise to it.
222
The dissent ultimately sided with the Commissioner, who would
deny percentage depletion on preproduction receipts. Thus, for the dis-
sent, all administrative problems are immediately resolved because there
is no necessity of relating preproduction receipts in earlier taxable years
to actual production in later taxable years. For the majority, however,
the practical problems of administration abound. The following discus-
sion analyzes these problems in two parts: (a) a presentation of three
alternative methods of calculating and deducting percentage depletion on
preproduction receipts, and (b) a consideration of the practical adminis-
trative problems related to allowing percentage depletion on preproduc-
tion receipts.
a. three alternative methods of calculating and deducting percentage
depletion on preproduction receipts
There are at least three alternative methods of calculating and de-
ducting percentage depletion on preproduction receipts.223 These meth-
ods are:
(1) calculate and deduct the percentage depletion allowance
in the taxable year that preproduction revenue is received,
(2) calculate the percentage depletion allowance in the taxa-
ble year that preproduction revenue is received and deduct
the allowance in taxable years of actual production, and
(3) calculate and deduct the percentage depletion allowance
in taxable years of actual production.
220. See infra notes 231-51 and accompanying text.
221. Engle, 464 U.S. at 226. See supra note 86.
222. Engle, 464 U.S. at 230 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See supra note 114.
223. See ARTHUR YOUNG'S OIL & GAs FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, 565 (J. Houghton
22d ed. 1984); Note, Percentage Depletion on Oil and Gas Lease Bonuses and Advance Royal-
ties: Engle v. Commissioner, Glass v. Commissioner, and Farmar v. United States Reviewed,
35 BAYLOR L. REv. 97, 122 (1983); Jones, Analysis of CA-7 Engle decision allowing percentage
depletion absent abstraction, 57 J. TAX'N 230, 233 (1982); Bravenec, supra note 196, at 211-14.
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The first two alternative methods entail calculating the percentage
depletion allowance in the year that preproduction revenue is received.
Under these methods, the allowable depletion deduction would be calcu-
lated in the following manner. The preproduction receipts would be allo-
cated in accordance with an estimated ratio of primary and secondary/
tertiary oil and gas production levels. 24 Each allocated amount relating
to primary and secondary/tertiary oil and gas would then be divided by a
respective estimated average per barrel royalty amount to arrive at quan-
tities of production. The statutory depletable quantity limitation applica-
ble to that year would then be applied to determine whether the
depletable quantity limitation had been reached. The allocated
preproduction receipts, as limited by the statutory depletable quantity,
would then be multiplied by the applicable depletion rates for primary
and secondary/tertiary oil and gas production for that year to arrive at
the allowable percentage depletion deduction."' 5
The first two methods differ with respect to the timing of the per-
centage depletion deduction. Under the first method, the depletion al-
lowance would be deducted in the taxable year that preproduction
revenue is received.226 Under the second method, the depletion allow-
ance would be amortized and deducted over the productive life of the
lease using a unit of production method.227
Under the third method, preproduction receipts would be amor-
tized, by means of a unit of production method,228 into gross income
224. This allocation is necessary for preproduction payments received in years prior to 1984
because of the different percentage depletion rates for primary and secondary/tertiary oil and
gas production. Beginning in 1984, this allocation is no longer necessary because the percent-
age depletion rates for both primary and secondary/tertiary production have been equalized.
See supra note 19.
225. Appendices I and II illustrate the calculation of the percentage depletion allowance on
preproduction receipts under the first and second methods in which the allowance is calculated
in the taxable year that preproduction revenue is received. Appendix I is for the taxable year
1985. Thus, there is no allocation of preproduction receipts between estimated primary and
secondary/tertiary production levels. Appendix II is for the taxable year 1983. Thus,
preproduction receipts are allocated between estimated primary and secondary/tertiary pro-
duction levels.
226. This percentage depletion deduction would still be subject to the 50% taxable income
from the property limitation of I.R.C. § 613A(a) (1982), supra note 6, and the 65% taxable
income limitation of I.R.C. § 613A(d)(1) (1982), supra note 113.
227. A unit of production method of allocation involves allocating in proportion to a pro-
duction ratio. The production ratio constitutes a fraction in which the numerator is the total
actual units of mineral production and the denominator is the total estimated units of minerals
remaining in the ground as of the beginning of the taxable year. 8 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEY-
ERS, OIL AND GAS LAW, 940 (1984). A unit of production method is currently used to com-
pute cost depletion. I.R.C. § 611(a) (1982); Treas. Reg. § 1.611-2(a) (1960). See supra note 5.
228. See supra note 227.
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from the property over the productive life of the property for the sole
purpose of computing the depletion allowance. The depletable quantity
limitation applicable for the year of production would be applied with
respect to the actual number of units produced. The amortized portion
of preproduction receipts, as limited by the statutory depletable quantity,
would be allocated in accordance with the actual ratio of primary oil and
gas and secondary/tertiary oil and gas production levels.2 29 These allo-
cated amounts of preproduction receipts, plus the gross income from
property generated by actual production for that year, would then be
multiplied by the applicable depletion rates for primary and secondary/
tertiary oil and gas production for that year in order to arrive at the
percentage depletion deduction available for that year. 30
b. practical administrative problems related to allowing percentage
depletion on preproduction receipts
Various administrative difficulties accompany the three alternative
methods of computing percentage depletion on preproduction receipts.2 31
First, the reliance of the first and second methods upon an estimated
ratio of primary and secondary/tertiary oil and gas production levels,
2 32
would likely become a point of controversy between taxpayers and the
IRS. Taxpayers who have exceeded the depletable quantity limitation
would tend to estimate the production ratio in favor of the type of pro-
duction commanding the highest market price. In doing so, taxpayers
would arrive at smaller estimated quantities of production with respect to
preproduction receipts, thus maximizing the amount of production in-
come eligible for percentage depletion. This problem could only be re-
solved on a case-by-case basis by means of government administrative
review.2 33 This problem does not accompany the third method because
229. See supra note 224.
230. See supra note 226.
Appendices III and IV illustrate the calculation of the percentage depletion allowance on
preproduction receipts under the third method in which the allowance is calculated in a taxa-
ble year of actual production. Both of these appendices are for the taxable year 1983. Thus,
the preproduction receipts are allocated between estimated primary and secondary/tertiary
production levels.
231. Appendix V provides a crosscutting analysis of the practical administrative problems
and their resolutions for each of the three alternative methods of calculating and deducting
percentage depletion on preproduction receipts.
232. See supra note 224.
233. The IRS would likely take the opposing position of estimating the production ratio in
favor of the type of production commanding the lowest market price in order to maximize the
amount of income tax that could be presently collected. Presumably, upon review, the IRS
and the taxpayer would negotiate a fair estimate.
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that method relies on an actual, rather than estimated, ratio of primary
and secondary/tertiary oil and gas production levels.
Second, amortizing the allowable percentage depletion deduction
(method two) or the preproduction receipts (method three) over the pro-
ductive life of the property entails estimating the property's mineral re-
serve. This reserve estimate would likely become a point of controversy
between taxpayers and the IRS. Taxpayers, desiring to maximize the
deductible amount of percentage depletion, would likely minimize the
estimated reserve, thus maximizing the amortized allowable amount of
percentage depletion.2 3a This problem could only be resolved on a case-
by-case basis by means of government administrative review.23 This
problem does not accompany the first method because that method does
not amortize either the percentage depletion allowance or preproduction
receipts over the productive life of the property.
Third, with respect to the first and second methods, there is a possi-
bility that taxpayers could avail themselves of multiple depletable quan-
tity limitations with respect to one production run. Taxpayers would be
subject to one set of depletable quantity limitations during preproduction
years and a second set of depletable quantity limitations during actual
production years. This problem could be resolved by reducing the de-
pletable quantity limitations applicable during taxable years of actual
production by the depletable quantity amounts computed with respect to
the preproduction taxable years. This problem does not accompany the
third method because that method utilizes the depletable quantity limita-
tion applicable to the year of production in computing the deferred per-
centage depletion deduction.
Fourth, with respect to the second and third methods, if the prop-
erty is transferred by sale, exchange, gift, death or other disposition,
nothing in section 613A or in prior case law indicates what would be-
come of the deferred percentage depletion amount. There are at least
two logical possibilities: (1) the deferred amount carries over to the new
owner of the property, or (2) the deferred amount does not carry over
and is therefore lost because the original owner would no longer have a
production or income flow over which to amortize the deferred deduc-
tion. 36 This problem does not accompany the first method because that
234. Under present law, this problem accompanies cost depletion, which is based upon esti-
mating the property's mineral reserves. Treas. Reg. § 1.611-2(a) (1960). See supra note 5.
235. The IRS would likely take the opposing position of maximizing the estimated reserve
in order to maximize the amount of income tax that presently could be collected. Presumably,
upon review, the IRS and the taxpayer would negotiate a fair estimate.
236. A third possibility involves deducting the remaining deferred deduction during the
year of disposition. This possibility is not logical because the deferred deduction is attributable
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method does not defer any portion of the percentage depletion deduction
on preproduction receipts.237
Fifth, the 50% taxable income from property limitation of section
613(a)238 and the 65% taxable income limitation of section 613A(d)(1) 239
would become distorted. 2'
Under the first method, these limitations would be distorted because
taxpayers could avail themselves of multiple applications of these limita-
tions. This would occur because percentage depletion deductions related
to a single oil and gas interest would be taken in both preproduction and
actual production taxable years. Deducting percentage depletion in
preproduction years would significantly increase the total amount of al-
lowable percentage depletion for taxpayers who may have otherwise ex-
ceeded the 50% and 65% limitations during production years. This
distortion could be corrected by taxpayers amortizing both net income
from preproduction receipts and preproduction percentage depletion de-
ductions over the productive life of the property, by a unit of production
method.24 During each taxable year of actual production, a portion of
the preproduction receipts and preproduction percentage depletion de-
ductions, proportionate to the actual units produced, would be added
back into taxable income for the sole purpose of computing the 50% and
65% limitations.
Under the second and third methods, the 50% and 65% limitations
to the taxpayer's future mineral production which would have never occurred due to the tax-
payer's disposition of the property.
237. However, upon early disposition of the property, it would be appropriate for the tax-
payer to reduce the amount of percentage depletion allowances previously deducted. This
could be accomplished by the taxpayer amending preproduction taxable year returns or by the
taxpayer restoring some portion of the percentage depletion allowances previously deducted to
income in the year of disposition of the property. For a discussion of income restoration, see
supra note 151 and accompanying text.
238. I.R.C. § 613(a) (1982). See supra note 6.
239. I.R.C. § 613A(d)(1). See supra note 6.
240. It has been suggested, without further explanation, that the 90% net income limitation
of I.R.C. § 4988(b) pertaining to the windfall profit tax on domestic crude oil would also be
distorted. ARTHUR YOUNG'S OIL & GAS FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, 565 (J. Houghton
22d ed. 1984). I.R.C. § 4986 (1982), enacted by Congress in connection with the decontrol of
domestic oil prices, imposes a temporary excise tax on the windfall profit from the production
and sale of domestic crude oil. I.R.C. § 4988(b) (1982) limits the amount of windfall profit tax
on any barrel of oil to 90% of the net income attributable to each barrel of oil. In calculating
the net income attributable to a barrel of oil, I.R.C. § 4988(b)(3)(B)(i) (1982) provides that no
deduction shall be allowed for depletion. Because no deduction for depletion is allowed, the
presence or absence of depletion does not affect the calculation of the 90% net income limita-
tion. Thus, the percentage depletion allowance on preproduction receipts, whether deducted
in a preproduction or in a subsequent taxable year, should not affect the calculation of the 90%
net income limitation of § 4988(b).
241. See supra note 227.
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would be distorted because the income related to these limitations al-
ready would have been reported in a preproduction year. This distortion
could be corrected by adding back to taxable income, for the sole purpose
of computing these various limitations, a portion of net income from
preproduction receipts reported in prior years proportionate to the amor-
tized amount of percentage depletion deducted in the year of actual
production.
Sixth, the noncorporate taxpayer's alternative minimum tax under
section 55242 and the corporate taxpayer's minimum tax under section
56243 would become distorted. In calculating the alternative minimum
tax, section 55(a)(1) provides for an annual exemption amount which
reduces the taxable income base upon which the alternative minimum
tax is imposed. 2" In a similar fashion, section 56(a) provides for an an-
nual exclusion amount which reduces the preference base upon which the
minimum tax is imposed.24 Under the first method, these two taxes
would become distorted because taxpayers could avail themselves of mul-
tiple exemptions or exclusions. This would occur because percentage de-
pletion tax preferences related to a single oil and gas interest would be
reported in both preproduction and actual production taxable years.
Thus, taxpayers would avail themselves of the exemptions or exclusions
related to preproduction years which would otherwise not have been
available if the percentage depletion allowance were deferred. As a re-
sult, the alternative minimum tax and the minimum tax could be reduced
or completely avoided. There is no obvious way to correct this distortion
without producing other alternative minimum tax and minimum tax dis-
tortions of equal or greater magnitude. This distortion does not arise in
connection with the second and third methods because percentage deple-
tion tax preferences related to a single oil and gas interest would be re-
ported only in actual production taxable years.
242. I.R.C. § 55 (1982 & Supp. 1984). Section 55 imposes on a noncorporate taxpayer a
20% tax on a taxpayer's alternative minimum taxable income, less an exemption amount. Id.
§ 55(a)(1). The taxpayer must pay this tax only to the extent that the alternative minimum tax
liability exceeds the taxpayer's regular tax liability. Id. § 55(a).
243. Id. § 56. Section 56 imposes on a corporate taxpayer a 15% tax on a taxpayer's total
tax preference items in excess of the greater of a $10,000 exclusion or the corporation's regular
tax liability for the taxable years. Id. § 56(a) (1982). Unlike the alternative minimum tax,
supra note 242, which is imposed on noncorporate taxpayers only to the extent that it exceeds
the regular tax, the corporate minimum tax is imposed in addition to the corporation's regular
tax. I.R.C. § 56(a) (1982).
244. I.R.C. § 55(a)(1) (1982). The exemption for the alternative minimum tax ranges be-
tween $20,000 to $40,000. Id. § 55(0.
245. Id. § 56(a). The exclusion for the minimum tax is the greater of $10,000 or the corpo-
ration's regular tax liability for the taxable year. Id.
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Seventh, the second and third methods would also distort the
noncorporate taxpayer's alternative minimum tax under section 55.246
The alternative minimum tax involves adding back tax preference items,
including excess percentage depletion,247 to a taxpayer's adjusted gross
income, which includes oil and gas net income,248 to arrive at alternative
minimum taxable income. Because deferred percentage depletion tax
preferences would be added back to alternative minimum taxable income
in taxable years subsequent to the inclusion of the preproduction receipts
in such income, the calculation would not properly match oil and gas
income with the tax preferences generated by the income.249 This distor-
tion could be corrected by adding back to alternative minimum taxable
income in actual production years an allocable portion of net income
from preproduction receipts reported in prior years proportionate to the
amortized amount of percentage depletion deducted in the year of actual
production. This distortion does not arise in connection with the first
method because under that method the percentage depletion tax prefer-
ence and its related preproduction oil and gas net income would both be
included in the same alternative minimum tax calculation.
Finally, in the event that the taxpayer failed to extract oil and gas,
or left oil and gas remaining in the ground, the first method would have
yielded the taxpayer a percentage depletion deduction which could not
be matched, in part or in whole, with actual oil and gas production that
failed to occur in later years. This problem would arise because under
the first method the taxpayer deducts percentage depletion during
preproduction taxable years whether or not production occurs in later
taxable years. When it becomes certain that future production will not
occur, this problem could be resolved in one of two ways. First, the tax-
payer could amend his preproduction taxable year returns in later taxa-
ble years, thereby reducing or eliminating the percentage depletion
deductions allowed based upon preproduction receipts.250 Secondly, the
246. Id. § 55 (1982 & Supp. 1984). See supra note 242.
247. I.R.C. § 57(a)(8) (1982). Section 57(a)(8) treats the percentage depletion deduction as
a tax preference item to the extent that percentage depletion exceeds both cost depletion and
the adjusted basis of the property, determined without regard to the depletion deduction, at the
end of the taxable year. Id.
248. Id. §§ 61(a)(6), 62(5) (1982 & Supp. 1984).
249. This distortion does not arise in connection with a corporate taxpayer's calculation of
the minimum tax under I.R.C. § 56 (1982 & Supp. 1984) because the minimum tax formula
does not include as a primary factor the income that generated the preference items. Thus, the
fact that the percentage depletion allowance is deducted in years subsequent to the reporting of
the preproduction income would not materially distort the outcome of the corporate minimum
tax calculation.
250. Engle, 464 U.S. at 226. See Note, supra note 223, at 122; Jones, supra note 223, at 233.
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taxpayer could restore to income in a later taxable year the percentage
depletion allowances previously deducted based upon preproduction re-
ceipts. 51 This problem does not accompany the second or third methods
because they defer deducting percentage depletion on preproduction re-
ceipts until taxable years of actual production.
IV. AFTERMATH
In May, 1984, the IRS announced that, in light of the Supreme
Court's decision in Commissioner v. Engle, independent producers and
royalty owners who receive advance royalties and lease bonuses will be
allowed to deduct percentage depletion in the year that such receipts are
includable in gross income.25 2 The applicable depletion rate and deplet-
able quantity limitation will also be determined with respect to the year
that the preproduction receipts are includable in gross income. The IRS
further stated that the depletable quantity limitation of section 613A(c)
must be applied by attributing a specific number of barrels to the ad-
vanced royalty or lease bonus. This calculation must be based on the
average price of oil or gas produced from the property during the taxable
year. If oil or gas is not produced from the property during the taxable
year, the barrel calculation must be based on the representative market
price. Finally, the IRS will promulgate regulations providing for appro-
priate reductions to the depletable quantity limitations applicable in fu-
ture years in order to prevent taxpayers from availing themselves of
multiple depletable quantity limitations related to the same production
run.
253
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Engle addressed the issue of
whether the language of section 613A, limiting percentage depletion to
stated quantities of production, was intended to (1) establish a limit on
the amount of such depletion which the taxpayer may claim, or (2) estab-
lish production within the taxable year as a prerequisite to any deduc-
tion. Both the majority and the dissent analyzed this issue in terms of
the statute's language, legislative history, congressional purpose and
practical problems of administration.
The key presumption of the majority's argument is that section
251. Cf restoration rules under Treas. Reg. § 1.612-3(a)(2), -3(b)(2) (1960), supra note 151
and accompanying text.
252. I.R.S. Announcement 84-59, 1984-23 I.R.B. 58.
253. Id.
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613A was enacted with the dual purpose of repealing the percentage de-
pletion allowance for the major integrated oil companies and simultane-
ously spurring domestic production. There is no disagreement within the
Court regarding the statute's purpose of repealing percentage depletion
for the major integrated oil companies because the statute, on its face,
accomplishes this purpose. The majority's assertion, however, that sec-
tion 613A was also intended to spur domestic production, is tenuous.
Given the repeal of the percentage depletion subsidy for the major inte-
grated oil companies and the severe reduction of the subsidy for the in-
dependent producers and royalty owners, Congress could not have
rationally expected to increase domestic production by enacting the
statute.
Thus, the majority's assertion that the statute was intended to spur
domestic production must fail. Likewise, the majority's arguments that
the Commissioner's interpretation is unreasonable must fail. Although
the Commissioner's interpretation might have discouraged domestic pro-
duction, such discouragement is simply not contrary to any intended
purpose of the statute. Ironically, contrary to the majority's intent, their
decision may induce oil and gas producers to defer domestic production
because the allowance of percentage depletion on preproduction receipts,
in effect, subsidizes the holding costs of oil and gas leases.
Ultimately, the majority's decision rests on its determination that
the taxpayers' interpretation of the statute is more reasonable than the
Commissioner's interpretation. At least with respect to practical
problems of administration, that finding is doubtful. While the Commis-
sioner's interpretation creates no practical administrative problems, the
taxpayers' interpretation gives rise to complex and abundant administra-
tive problems.
Finally, assuming arguendo that the taxpayers' interpretation is the
more reasonable one, the majority has clearly stepped outside the bound-
aries of the Court's traditional approach that "[t]he choice among rea-
sonable interpretations is for the Commissioner, not the courts. 254
Although departing from traditional principles of law is not inherently
wrong, such departure should be supported by acknowledgment and rea-
son. The majority, however, failed to acknowledge or account for its
departure from the Court's well trodden path. Thus, in the final analysis,
the majority's argument remains severely deficient. The Court, there-
254. National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 488 (1979). See supra
notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
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fore, should have deferred to the Commissioner's interpretation of the
statute.
Moses Jesse Kushman*
* M.B.A., 1980, University of Southern California; M.B.T., 1981, University of South-
ern California.
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